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Summary: The current global financial and economic crisis, which exacerbates the impacts of the 
energy and food crises that immediately preceded it, has spread to the developing countries 
endangering recent gains in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. The effects of the crisis 
are likely to vary substantially between countries and between individuals within the same country. 
Children are among the most vulnerable population, particularly in a period of crisis. Especially in 
least developed countries, where social safety nets programs are missing or poorly performing and 
public fiscal space is extremely limited, households with few economic opportunities are at a higher 
risk of falling into (monetary) poverty, suffering from hunger, removing children from school and into 
work, and losing access to health services. This study simulates the impacts of the global economic 
crisis and alternative policy responses on different dimensions of child welfare in Western and Central 
Africa (WCA) over the period 2009-2011. It is based on country studies for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
and Ghana, which broadly represent the diversity of economic conditions in WCA countries. In order 
to capture the complex macro-economic effects of the crisis and the various policy responses – on trade, 
investment, remittances, aid flows, goods and factor markets – and to then trace their consequences in 
terms of child welfare – monetary poverty, hunger (caloric poverty), school participation, child labour, 
and access to health services – a combination of macro- and micro-analysis was adopted. 
 
The simulations suggest that the strongest effects are registered in terms of monetary poverty and 
hunger, although large differences between countries emerge. More moderate impacts are predicted in 
terms of school participation, child labour, and access to health care, although these are still 
significant and require urgent policy responses. Specifically, Ghana is the country where children are 
predicted to suffer the most in terms of monetary poverty and hunger, while Burkina Faso is where 
the largest deteriorations in schooling, child labour and access to health services are simulated. 
 
Among the policy responses examined to counteract the negative effects of the crisis on child well-
being, a targeted cash transfer to predicted poor children is by far the most effective program. A 
comparison between a universal and targeted approach is also presented. 
Keywords: global economic crisis, child poverty, hunger, education, child labour, health, West and 
Central Africa, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Ghana, social protection 
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A UNICEF-PEP Africa Research Project on the Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on 
Children in Western and Central Africa  
 
This study assesses the potential effects of the global economic crisis on children in Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon and Ghana and the proposal of concrete policy responses to the policy makers. It is the 
result of a research project promoted by the Regional Office of UNICEF for West and Central Africa 
and led by the African office of the Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) research network, in 
collaboration with the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre and the UNICEF Division of Policy and 
Practice. PEP is financed by the Government of Canada through the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and by the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). PEP’s African office (PEP-Africa) is 
based at the Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale (CRES, Dakar). 
 
A regional and three country teams of researchers were formed. The regional team, coordinated by 
PEP-Africa, was composed of researchers from Africa (GREAT, Mali; University of Yaoundé, 
Cameroon), from the Université Laval in Canada and the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. The 
regional team developed the basic methodology, provided training and closely supervised the three 
country studies, and prepared a regional report and policy brief synthesizing the results for the three 
countries. The country teams led the country analyses, interacted with the local policy committees and 
wrote their respective country reports. 
 
This research was initiated in June 2009: at the end of that month the regional team provided the 
methodology and held in Accra an intensive training workshop for the local teams. A visit to each 
country followed in August. In the following months the regional and country teams carried out the 
analyses and presented the preliminary results of the study in November and December at the 
WCARO Social Policy Network Meeting in Dakar, the ODI-UNICEF conference on “The global 
economic crisis – Including children in the policy response” in London and the AERC conference on 
“Rethinking African Economic Policy in Light of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis” in 
Nairobi. In the following two months the regional and country studies were finalized by including 
also some additional policy responses ad hoc to each country. 
 
The main outcomes of this project are: 
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1.  INTRODUCTION   
The global financial and economic crisis has complex and profound impacts on countries 
around the world including the countries of West and Central  Africa.  The October 2009 
update of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted 1.1 per cent negative growth in 
the global economy in 2009.  
 
While the global economy is expected to gradually recover in 2010 with numerous monetary 
and fiscal stimulus programmes in developed countries, analysts generally agree that growth 
will remain weak (IMF 2009a). The magnitude and persistence of the financial and economic 
crisis  will  depend,  among  other  things,  on  the  confidence  of  actors  in  the  international 
financial  system  and  the  efficacy  of  economic  revival  plans  that  most  industrialized  and 
emerging countries have begun to put into action.  
 
While developing countries’ relatively weak integration into the global financial system has 
sheltered  them  from  the  effects  of  financial  contagion,  the  ensuing  economic  crisis  has 
affected them directly through international trade, investment, foreign aid, remittances and 
other channels. 
 
The macroeconomic impacts and the distributive effects of the global crisis in developing 
countries will largely depend on the magnitude and length of the recession in developed 
countries, the initial conditions in each country and their macroeconomic policies to respond 
to the crisis. However, designing practical and appropriate policies in developing countries to 
stimulate growth and protect vulnerable populations groups, in particular children, from the 
harmful effects of the crisis requires an understanding of the likely magnitude and nature of 
these effects. 
 
The  global  financial  and  economic  crisis  threatens  growth  and  poverty  reduction 
achievements that have recently been accomplished in many developing countries. African 
growth will decline by two thirds according to IMF forecasts – from 6.2 and 5.2 per cent, 
respectively, in 2007 and 2008 to 1.7 per cent in 2009 - with sub-Saharan Africa facing a 
more extreme decline – at 1.3 per cent in 2009 compared to 7.0 to 5.5 per cent, respectively, 
in 2007 and 2008 (IMF 2009b).  
 
As  we  would  expect,  poverty  tends  to  increase  in  a  period  of  crisis  with  the  magnitude 
depending on the depth of the crisis, but also the change in inequality (World Bank, 2008), 
which is supposed to rise, as the poor often suffer disproportionately from crisis. 
 
It is difficult to evaluate the welfare impacts of a crisis on individual well-being in terms of 
monetary and non-monetary aspects. At the beginning of the crisis, households adapt mostly 
by increasing their labour supply and consuming past savings. However, in a longer period of 
crisis  with  few  economic  opportunities,  households  are  eventually  forced  to  reduce  their 
consumption and possibly withdraw children from school and go without health consultations 
in case of illness.
1 
                                                           
1 These results have been observed, for example, in Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
(World Bank 2008).   2
 
To our knowledge this research project is among the first attempts to use economic models to 
simulate the effects of this global crisis on children. Past economic crises have been shown to 
be detrimental to children in various dimensions of their well-being. As shown by the table 
below, past (local or regional) economic crises had strong impacts on household welfare. For 
example, past crises led to an increase in poverty ranging from 1 percentage point in Brazil 
(1989) to a dramatic 12.2 points in Venezuela (1994) (Lustig 2000). Lustig also clearly shows 
that in the years following this crisis, poverty rates continued to rise, albeit less quickly. 
 
Table 1: Economic Crises and Poverty in Selected Countries (headcount ratios) 
country  before crisis  year of crisis  change in 
% points 
Argentina°  25.2  34.6  9.4 
  (1987)  (1989)  
  16.8  24.8  8.0 
  (1993)  (1995)  
Brazil°°  27.9  28.9  1.0 
  (1989)  (1990)  
Costa Rica  29.6  32.3  2.7 
  (1981)  (1982)  
Indonesia  11.3  18.9  7.6 
  (1996)  (1998)  
Korea  2.6  7.3  4.7 
  (1997)  (1998)  
Malaysia  8.2  10.4  2.2 
  (1997)  (1998)  
Mexico  36  43  7.0 
  (1994)  (1995)  
Thailand  9.8  12.9  3.1 
  (1997)  (1998)  
Venezuela  25.7  32.7  7.0 
  (1982)  (1983)  
  40  44.4  4.4 
  (1988)  (1989)  
  41.4  53.6  12.2 
  (1993)  (1994)  
Source: Skoufias (2003: 1088) and Lustig (2000: 19) 
Note: Years are reported in parentheses. * 1 year after the crisis; ° data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos 
Aires; data for Brazil refer to all metropolitan areas only. 
 
Mendoza (2009), in his review on the effects of aggregate economic shocks on children, cites 
that infant mortality rate increased by 2.5 percentage points following the economic crisis in 
Peru in the late 1980s, 1.4 points in Indonesia as a result of the Asian economic crisis in 1998 
and by 7 per cent above the expected levels in Mexico following the 1995 crisis. Christian 
(2010) reviews numerous cases of increased child mortality and malnutrition resulting from 
different economic crises in selected developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Other studies reported by Mendoza (2009) and covering Brazil, Tanzania and Guatemala 
show how economic shocks led to higher unemployment rates amongst the parents and, as a   3
consequence, to a higher probability of children dropping out of school and engaging in work 
activities. 
 
There are also likely to be long-term consequences of crisis on children as households adjust 
to falling incomes by diminishing spending on education and health,
2 by substituting food 
consumption  towards  lower  quality  items  and  by  changing  intra-household  resources’ 
allocation to the disadvantage of women and girls.
3 
 
To understand the nature and the extent of the effects of the economic crisis in developing 
countries requires a rigorous analysis of the transmission mechanisms at both the macro and 
micro  levels.  In  this  study,  we  attempt  to  predict  ex  ante  the  impacts  of  the  crisis,  and 
possible policy responses, on children in West and Central Africa (WCA). As timely data 
monitoring child well-being are not readily available to guide the rapid implementation of 
policies to protect children, we develop a predictive model that anticipates the impacts of the 
crisis on various essential dimensions of child welfare. 
 
The  analysis  is  limited  to  three  countries  in  WCA  representing  some  of  the  diversity  of 
economic characteristics of countries in the region: Burkina Faso, a landlocked country with 
little  integration  into  the  world  economy,  mainly  through  exports  of  agricultural  raw 
materials  such  as  cotton;  Cameroon,  a  moderately  integrated  country  mainly  exporting 
natural resources such as oil and timber; and Ghana, well integrated into the global economy 
and exporting both agricultural goods (cocoa) and natural resources (gold and timber) with 
significant inflows of foreign investments over the last decade. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized into four sections. A general overview of the expected 
impacts of the crisis on developing countries, particularly in WCA, and the main channels of 
transmission is provided in section 2. The following section summarizes the methodological 
approach used to predict the specific impacts in the three countries. The crisis and policy 
response simulation scenarios and results are presented and discussed in Section 4. The main 
findings of the study are briefly summarized and recommendations made in the conclusion. 
 
2.  MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN WCA: AN OVERVIEW 
In 2009, the world economy experienced its worst performance since the Second World War 
according to the IMF (2009a). World economic output is forecast to have fallen by 1.1 per 
cent in 2009. This marks a substantial downward revision from the forecasts that the IMF 
presented in January 2009 and November 2008, an illustration of the difficulty in predicting 
how the economic situation will evolve in the coming months and years.  
 
Growing  economic  interdependence  has  considerably  increased  vulnerability  to  global 
economic crisis in both developed and developing countries. Analysts are unanimous about 
                                                           
2 See, for example, Attanasio and Szekely (2004) for the case of Mexico during the 1990s. 
3 As discussed, for example, in Dercon and Krishnan (2000) for the case of individual shocks in Ethiopia in 
1994 and 1995.   4
the global nature of the crisis and reject any “decoupling” of growth in developing countries. 
However, Willem te Velde (2008) shows that structural changes and the increased role of 
China have led to a significantly lower sensitivity of economic growth in Africa with respect 
to  changes  in  growth  rates  in  the  OECD.  Indeed,  he  found  that  this  "growth  elasticity" 
declined from 0.5 during the 1980s to 0.2 by 2000-2007, suggesting that the fallout of the 
financial and economic crisis emanating from industrialized countries could be somewhat 
cushioned for African economies.  
 
The initial spread of the crisis to industrialized and emerging countries was mostly through 
the  financial  sector  as  a  result  of  their  strong  integration  into  the  international  financial 
system. In particular, exposure to subprime mortgages linked them to the heart of the crisis. 
According to the ILO (2009), the decoupling hypothesis for emerging economies has proven 
false, with the principal emerging economies also being hit by the crisis.  
 
In contrast to the industrialized and emerging economies that faced the direct effects of the 
financial crisis, it is the ensuing global economic crisis that is most affecting developing 
countries. The principal channels linking developing economies to the global economy are: 
trade, remittances, foreign investment and international aid. 
a.  Transmission channels 
·  Trade 
Worldwide, international trade recorded an average 9.3 per cent annual growth rate over the 
first  half  of  the  2000s,  more  than  double  the  3.8  per  cent  growth  for  global  economic 
production (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2009). However, international trade in goods and 
services has been more volatile than world output in recent decades and, consequently, could 
be an important channel through which the crisis is spread to developing economies (Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo 2009; World Bank 2008).  
 
External trade in goods and services is an important component of developing economies, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Indeed, developing countries have among the 
highest openness ratios in the world (table 2).
4 
 
The crisis affects both the volumes and prices of traded products. The IMF (2009c) forecasts 
a  15.0  per  cent  decline  in  export  volumes  for  the  advanced  economies  in  2009,  with  a 
corresponding  figure  of  6.5  per  cent  in  emerging  and  developing  economies.  Imported 
volumes are also forecasted to decline by 13.6 and 9.6 per cent, respectively, in emerging and 
developing  economies.  Prices  of  both  energy  and  non  energy  products  also  registered 




                                                           
4 Trade links are measured by trade openness which is the ratio of external exchange of goods and services - 
imports and exports - to GDP.   5







rate  Openness* 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.1  1.0  92.0  67.6 
Middle East and North Africa  3.8  3.9  104.4  60.1 
Asia  17.1  19.5  113.7  43.4 
South America  2.5  2.6  104.0  30.9 
China  3.9  5.6  141.5  56.3 
India  0.9  0.9  102.5  25.3 
Russian Federation  1.7  2.2  127.3  65.7 
North America  23.8  19.1  80.4  25.9 
European Union 27  39.2  39.0  99.5  64.9 
Rest of the World  6.0  6.2  103.2  61.0 
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  44.2 
Source: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6 
Note: Openness = Ratio of export and import to GDP; Coverage rate = ratio of export to import 
 
The financial crisis significantly reduced economic growth in emerging countries such as 
China and India in 2009, placing downward pressures on the demand and prices for primary 
products such as copper, petroleum and other natural resources. These negative repercussions 
for African economies, particularly for those that export primary minerals, are undeniable. 
Willem  te  Velde  (2008)  suggests  that  the  developing  countries  most  at  risk  are  those 
maintaining close trade relations with the industrialized countries in recession (e.g. Mexico), 
but also those who are dependent on high income-elasticity products (e.g. tourism in the 
Caribbean and many African countries) and on exports of products for which world prices 
have  fallen  (e.g.  copper  in  Zambia).  Consequently,  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  specific 
developing countries should be directly related to their respective external trade profiles.  
 
Export-import ratios (or "coverage rate"), measured by product group, draw attention to the 
heterogeneity in the structure of external trade for SSA (table 3). However, despite these 
large variations, the region, including the three countries covered in this study, has a trade 
surplus in primary sector products, which include agriculture and natural resources. SSA is 
also an importer of both food and non food manufactures as well as services.  
 
According to Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009), as a consequence of the crisis, countries that 
export manufactures and services can expect a decline in the volume of their transactions, 
whereas exporters of primary raw materials are more likely to face a drop in international 
prices. Therefore, the threat of deteriorating international trade in agricultural products and 
natural resources induced by the economic crisis hangs more heavily over SSA. According to 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009), SSA can expect to experience shocks more in terms of 
prices than volumes. However, they benefit from falling prices for non food manufactured 
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Table 3: Coverage rate (import to export ratio) 
 
Burkina 
Faso  Cameroon  Ghana  SSA  MENA  Asia  South 
America 
Agriculture  1.3  19.7  3.4  4.1  0.4  0.4  3.7 
Mining and minerals  2.3  1.6  2.4  53.7  29.7  0.2  4.1 
Processed food  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.3  0.6  3.5 
Other manufacturing  0.3  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.6  1.3  0.7 
Services  0.6  1.1  -  0.6  0.8  1.0  0.6 
All  0.4  1.1  0.5  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.0 
Source: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6 
Note: Coverage rate=Export  to import ratio;  SSA=Sub-Saharan  Africa (excluding South  Africa); MENA = 
Middle East and North Africa, including Israel and excluding Turkey; Asia excluding China, India and the 
Middle East. 
 
Figure 1: Food, energy, metal and agriculture raw material price indices, 2005-9 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund.  
Note:  Description:  Price  Index,  2005=100;  Food  includes  Cereal,  Vegetable  oils,  Meat,  Seafood,  Sugar, 
Bananas, and Oranges; Fuel (energy) includes Crude oil (petroleum), Natural gas, and Coal; Metals includes 
Copper,  Aluminium,  Iron  ore,  Tin,  Nickel,  Zinc,  Lead,  and  Uranium;  Agricultural  Raw  Materials  includes 
Timber, Cotton, Wool, Rubber, and Hides 
 
Commodity prices reached record levels in 2008 (figure 1). Since the third quarter of 2008, 
the global economic recession has been accompanied by a substantial decline in commodity 
prices. Over the first quarter of 2009, the average product price index was at the same level as 
the second quarter of 2005, four years earlier. Between July and December 2008, the global 
price index of energy recorded the most extreme fall, -63 per cent, followed by food and 
metal prices, respectively, by -45 and -33 per cent over the same period. The fall in the global 
price indices for agriculture raw materials was less extreme with -28 per cent between July 
and  December  2008.  Commodity  prices  have  recorded  strong  gains  over  recent  months. 
Energy and metal prices indices have rebounded respectively by 50 and 44 per cent between 
December  2008  and  2009;  agriculture  raw  materials  and  food  prices  have  also  posted 
respectively 28 and 17 per cent increases over the same period. 
 
Countries that are dependent on energy and mineral exports and food imports are particularly 
vulnerable to the price changes resulting from the global economic crisis. With the higher   7
reductions in their export revenues than their imports expenses, these countries face pressures 
on their current account balances. Agriculture exporting economies in SSA are expected to be 
less negatively impacted by the decline in commodity prices consecutive to the global crisis. 
These economies are highly dependent on energy and food imports and are likely to benefit 
more from the decline in their import prices. 
 
According to Willem te Velde (2008), countries with an external current account deficit are 
most at risk, facing strong pressures on their exchange rate and inflation. Countries exporting 
natural resources have benefited from higher prices and improved their terms of trade over 
the last few years. Consequently, many of them are in a better position to deal with the crisis, 
compared to the agricultural and manufacturing exporters in SA. On the other hand, the drop 
in energy prices is favourable to net petroleum importing countries after the recent surge that 
contributed significantly to deteriorating their external current account.  
 
The consequences of the crisis on the 
economy of Burkina Faso are likely to 
be  felt  in  all  sectors,  in  particular 
those linked to the global economy. A 
decline in export volumes and prices 
is  expected.  Indeed,  in  recent  years, 
Burkina  Faso's  exports  are 
increasingly  dominated  by  products 
that are dependent on global demand 
conditions,  in  particular  cotton  fibre 
and livestock products (Figure 2). The 
expected decline in exports is mainly 
attributable  to  a  contraction  in  the 
volume  of  exports  of  cotton  and, 
consequently, the fall of 56 per cent in 
cotton  price  from  its  peak  in  March 
2008 to March 2009 (figure 6). Since 
then,  the  prices  of  cotton  rebounded 
by 49 per cent between mid- and end 
2009. Livestock products witnessed a 
moderate decline of 17 per cent from 
August  2008  to  August  2009,  and 
have stagnated since then. 
 
Shocks to prices of Cameroon's major 
export  commodities  (oil  and 
petroleum  products)  remain  the 
principal  transmission  mechanism  of 
the  crisis  to  the  economy,  coupled 
with the decline in global demand for 
many  other  export  products  such  as 
timber and, to a lesser extent, rubber, 
Figure 2: Export structure, Burkina Faso 
 






Figure 3: Export structure, Cameroon 
 
Source: National Accounts 2007   8
cotton,  and  aluminium  (figure  3). 
Cameroon’s main export product, oil 
and  oil  products,  posted  a  severe 
decline  after  reaching  an  all  time 
record  price  in  July  2008.  In  the 
second  half  of  2008,  the  price 
correction  was  drastic:  -63  per  cent 
(figure 1). Therefore, export revenues 
are  expected  to  fall  by  1,017  billion 
CFA francs, representing 9.9 per cent 
of the GDP, between 2008 and 2009, 
with 40 per cent imputed to the fall in 
oil export revenues (IMF 2009d). 
 
Ghana  depends  primarily  on  natural 
resources: gold, cocoa, and timber for 
its  foreign  exchange  (figure  4). 
Ghanaian external trade of goods and 
services is expected to be less severely 
affected by the crisis than many other 
countries  largely  due  to  favourable 
terms  of  trade  developments 
associated  with  continuing  strong 
export  prices  for  gold  and  cocoa 
(figures  7  and  8)  and  a  less  severe 
decline for timber (figure 9) — its two 
main exports, and the lower prices of 
fuel, food, and machinery (figure 1), 
which  are  the  main  components  of 
Ghana’s imports (figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4: Export structure, Ghana 
 




Figure 5: Import structure 
 
Source:  National  Accounts  2004,  2005,  and  2007 
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Figure 6: Global prices of cotton and livestock products (US $ cents per pound) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (February 2009) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp. 
Note: Cotton Outlook 'A Index', Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, CIF Liverpool; Simple average price of beef 
(Australian and New Zealand 85% lean froes, FOB U.S. import price), poultry (whole bird spot price, Georgia 
docks) , lamb (frozen carcass Smithfield, London), swine (51-52% lean hogs, U.S. price) 
 
Figure 7: Global prices of cocoa (US $ per metric ton) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (February 2009) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp 
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Figure 9: World prices of timber and timber products (US $ per cubic metre) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (February 2009) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp.  
Note: Simple average of Hard Logs (Best quality Malaysian Meranti, import price Japan), Hard Sawnwood 
(Dark Red Meranti, select and better quality, C&F U.K port), Soft Logs (average export price from the U.S. for 
Douglas Fir), Soft Sawnwood (average export price of Douglas Fir, U.S. Price) 
 
·  Remittances 
According to World Bank (2008) and Willem te Velde (2008), the financial and economic 
crisis  will  reduce  remittances,  with  lower  numbers  of  migrants  and  smaller  amounts 
transferred per migrant. Migrants are a vulnerable group in their host countries, particularly 
new arrivals, who have the most difficulty in finding or maintaining employment during an 
economic crisis (ILO 2009). 
 
A slowdown in remittances’ growth was already registered between 2007 and 2008, from 16 
per  cent  in  2007  to  7  per  cent  in  2008  (Ratha,  Mohapatra  and  Silwal  2009).  Although 
remittances are not necessarily a major transmission channel of the crisis, their decline could 
be one of the factors that will prolong it according to Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009).  
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The DGEP (“Direction Général de l’Economie et la Prévision”) in Burkina Faso forecasts a 
decline of 2.2 per cent in remittances in 2009, which will undoubtedly contribute to reduce 
household consumption and savings. Although accounting only for 0.8  per cent of GDP, 
remittances in Cameroon are also expected to fall by 0.1 per cent of GDP, which corresponds 
to nearly 5.3 billion CFA francs according to an IMF report (2009d). In Ghana, according to 
Bank of Ghana data, net inward private transfers fell from 507.63 million US$ in the first 
quarter of 2008 to 397.08 million US$ in the first quarter of 2009. 
·  Foreign investment  
The economic crisis is expected to reduce the volume of inflows and increase the cost of 
capital for developing countries. While developing countries remain weakly integrated into 
international capital markets compared to emerging economies, the crisis could compromise 
the momentum achieved by a number of growing African countries in terms of mobilizing 
foreign capital (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2009).  
 
According to UNCTAD (2009), FDI towards markets in emerging economies fell by 10 per 
cent in 2008. OECD estimates are even more pessimistic, predicting that Latin America and 
Africa will not be spared from falling FDI. Countries that rely heavily on FDI may therefore 
be more  at risk than others (Willem te Velde  2008). However,  a World Bank  review of 
studies  on  previous  economic  crises  points  out  that  capital  transfers  and  investments  – 
particularly FDI – are less stable than exchange in goods and services or remittances (World 
Bank 2008).  
 
The decline in the volume and price of exports leads to lower profit margins for exporters, 
implying lower profitability for investment projects. Combined with the crisis in liquidity and 
confidence  in  financial  markets,  bank  loans  could  undergo  unprecedented  declines.  The 
World Bank (2008) review on past financial crises indicates that the 1995 peso crisis in 
Mexico was marked by a reallocation of banks’ financial portfolios to the detriment of loans. 
The enormous fall in the volume of credit offered by banks especially affected the supply of 
commercial credit.  
 
Foreign investment in Burkina Faso is expected to decline due to uncertainty and falling rates 
of return. In particular, FDI targeting mining, road construction and manufacturing industries 
are at risk. Indeed, important road and infrastructure projects are already on hold or lagging, 
likely because of the crisis. According to projections by the DGEP, FDI was 36.5 billion CFA 
francs in 2008, more than three times lower than in 2007, and appears to be continuing to 
deteriorate with the contracting global economy. 
 
Several large investment projects have been postponed in Cameroon because of the tighter 
international  financial  conditions,  particularly  in  the  sectors  of  energy,  aluminium  and 
mining, as reported by the IMF (2009d). According to the latter, foreign capital inflows are 
expected to fall by 86 billions of CFA francs, representing 0.8 per cent of GDP. 
 
Data  compiled  by  the  Ghana  Investment  Promotion  Council  on  FDI  shows  that  inward 
investments in the first quarter of 2009 was only one-third of the level of a year earlier. In the   12
area  of  portfolio  investments,  Ghana  benefited  in  2007  and  early  2008  from  foreign 
investments in the domestic treasury bill market. As risk aversion increased following the 
global financial crisis, these investments were partly liquidated in late-2008 and early-2009. 
Ghana issued a debut Eurobond in late 2007 and was considering further market placements 
in late 2008. These were cancelled when Ghana’s market access was effectively closed as a 
result of the global crisis. With regard to privatization proceeds, the country experienced 
inward capital investments associated with divestitures in both 2007 and 2008. Given the 
increased risk aversion after the global financial crisis, further such revenues are not in near-
term prospects. Private remittances and capital flows are projected at $2.2 billion in 2009, 
down from more than $4 billion in the preceding two years. This shortfall accounts heavily 
for the projected balance of payments deficit in 2009 and for the projected continuing decline 
in foreign reserves. Without any exceptional financing in 2009, gross reserves would decline 
to  a  projected  $1.5 billion  (1.5  months  of  imports).  With  $450  million  of  exceptional 
financing from the World Bank, IMF, and other bilateral creditors, foreign reserves would be 
stabilized in 2009 at a projected $1.95 billion (1.9 months of import cover). 
·  International aid  
International aid commitments made at the Summits of Gleneagles (2005) and Monterrey 
(2002) were already not being respected, but the flow of official development assistance may 
be further adversely affected by the crisis. The problem of indebtedness and the instability of 
fiscal policy in industrialized countries could negatively affect development aid and donor 
countries’  commitments  to  contribute  0.7  per  cent  of  their  GDP  to  developing  countries 
(Willem te Velde 2008). As such, countries that depend on international aid face elevated 
risks of being affected by the global financial and economic crisis. However, World Bank 
(2008)  suggests  that  international  aid  would  be  the  least  volatile  component  and  debt 
servicing costs are the main difficulty that developing countries could be confronted with in 
the  case  that  the  global  economic  crisis  induces  a  contraction  in  their  economy.  The 
mobilization of foreign aid depends not only on the conditions of donor countries but also the 
performance of the current IMF Policy Support Instrument (PSI). For example, IMF (2009c) 
projections indicate a slight decline of foreign aid received by Burkina Faso from 2.9 per cent 
of GDP in 2008 to 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2009. 
b.  Macroeconomic impacts 
For developing countries, the crisis is very likely to compromise recent growth and poverty 
reduction  achievements  by  exacerbating  the  impacts  of  the  energy  and  food  crises  that 
immediately preceded it. While increasing integration of these economies into the  global 
economy  had  been  a  source  of  significant  economic  growth  in  the  previous  years,  this 
exposure has also made their economies more vulnerable to global crises (World Bank 2008). 
It is also expected that developing economies, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, will 
be less able to adjust to the crisis than industrialized economies because of their weaker 
macroeconomic, fiscal and financial contexts. Initial evidence already points to substantial 
impacts on our focus countries. 
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·  Burkina Faso 
In  Burkina  Faso,  rising  oil  and  food  prices,  falling  remittances,  the  massive  return  of 
emigrants and poor  rainy  seasons have all contribute to compromise  growth and poverty 
reduction over the last decade. The countries per capita GDP is estimated at 480 US$ in 2008 
(Annex I - Table 1). Average growth rate of GDP was 5.3 per cent in real terms between 
2005 and 2008 and is expected to fall to 3.5 per cent in 2009, according to IMF projections 
(IMF  2009b).  The  economic  slowdown  in  2009  is  largely  due  to  difficulties  faced  in 
agriculture, in particular the cotton sector. In fact, agriculture has suffered from poor spatial 
and  temporal  distribution  of  rainfall  and  flooding  in  several  regions,  resulting  in 
disappointing growth rates in the primary sector: 0.9 per cent and -0.5 per cent, respectively, 
in 2006 and 2007. Most dramatically, cotton production fell by 33 per cent from 649,400 tons 
in 2006/2007 to 434,000 tons during the 2007/2008 campaign. The impacts of this fall in 
production are exacerbated by the recent decline in producer prices. The global economic 
crisis  will  certainly  increase  the  difficulties  of  the  agricultural  sector  by  further  reducing 
producer prices and access to trade credit. 
·  Cameroon 
With an average economic growth rate of about 4 per cent annually over the past half-decade 
and an income per  capita of 1,150 US$ in 2008 (Annex  I – Table 1), Cameroon's GDP 
growth rate is expected to fall to 1.6 per cent in 2009 according to IMF (2009a) forecasts. 
The deteriorations of the external position – mainly due to the substantial decrease of the 
prices  of  its  main  export  commodity,  i.e.  oil  and  petroleum  products  -  and  of  the  fiscal 
account are identified as the main causes of this slowdown. The net increase in the external 
current account deficit is estimated at 7.6 per cent of GDP, bringing foreign currency reserves 
from 6.2 to 4.5 months of imports between 2008 and 2009 (IMF 2009a). The fiscal surplus of 
2 per cent of GDP in 2008 is projected to transform into a 1 per cent deficit in 2009.  
·  Ghana 
Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is experiencing the impact of the global 
crisis. Although Ghana’s exports are expected to be less severely affected by the crisis than 
many other countries given persistent strong export prices for gold and cocoa - its two main 
exports - private remittances are falling, foreign direct investment appears to be lower, and 
access to global credit has suffered a setback. These developments have had a direct impact 
on the balance of payments, domestic demand, and economic  growth.  At the same time, 
currency pressures have triggered higher inflation, requiring tighter monetary policy, with 
further adverse impacts on economic activity. The degree of economic slowdown in 2009 
remains uncertain, as quarterly GDP data are not compiled in Ghana. The Bank of Ghana’s 
Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) at the end of May 2009 declined by 2.2 per 
cent in real terms relative to the previous year, suggesting real GDP growth below the 5 per 
cent mark, down from the peak of 7.3 per cent in 2008. Similarly, the Bank of Ghana’s 
survey of business and consumer confidence in June 2009 reported a decline in optimism 
compared to the April 2009 survey. The IMF’s regional economic outlook in October 2009 
forecasted  a  4.5  per  cent  GDP  growth  rate  in  Ghana,  representing  a  reduction  of  2.8 
percentage points compared to the 2008 performance. Slower economic growth is having a   14
clear  impact  on  government  revenue  collections,  with  domestic  VAT  collections  and 
corporate income taxes falling 27 and 17 per cent, respectively, below government target 
levels in the first half of 2009. At the same time, public deficit financing has been adversely 
impacted. No financing from international credit markets or through sales of national assets 
to foreign investors is projected for 2009-2010, compared to financing in the range of 4-6 per 
cent of GDP during 2007-08. In terms of the balance of payments, lower remittances and a 
decline in capital inflows contributed to a sharp decline in foreign reserves in late 2008 and 
the  first  half  of  2009.  The  Ghanaian  national  currency  (Cedi)  depreciated  significantly 
through late-2008 and into 2009, contributing to substantially increase the 12-month inflation 
rate from the 10 per cent range a year earlier to close to 20 per cent through the first half of 
2009. A significant contribution to this trend came from import prices, including a 30 per 
cent rise in petroleum product prices that led to increased transport costs in May 2009. The 
main social and economic characteristics of the country are presented in Annex I - Table 1. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The impact of global financial and economic crisis is expected to differ among developing 
countries depending on their initial conditions and their links to the international financial 
market and the global economy. It is also likely to differ substantially between individuals 
and households within any given country according to their sources of income, consumption 
patterns and other characteristics. 
 




As depicted in Figure 10, the global economic recession affects the demand for and prices of 
commodities traded by these countries, foreign aid, FDI and remittances. These changes have   15
large  and  varying  impacts  on  product  markets,  factor  markets,  government  finances, 
international trade and households. To capture these, macro-economic analysis is required. 
 
In order to then track the impacts of these changes on individual households, their members, 
and in particular children, the macro level analysis needs to be complemented by a micro-
investigation. Consequently, a combination of macro- and micro- analyses is needed to fully 
capture the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on developing countries and to 
help formulating policies to mitigate their effects on households and children. 
 
Macro-economic analysis estimates the potential impact of the global crisis and alternative 
policy responses on key variables such as wage rates, employment, food and non-food prices, 
etc.  Given  the  magnitude  of  the  shocks  engendered  by  the  crisis,  a  computable  general 
equilibrium  (CGE)  framework  is  required  to  incorporate  the  structural  aspects  of  the 
economy and capture the many and varied direct and indirect interactions between factor 
markets,  good  markets,  households,  government,  private  firms  and  the  foreign  partners. 
However, CGEs generally cannot distinguish the impacts on individual households and their 
members, as required to evaluate the poverty, nutritional, educational and health impacts on 
children. 
 
The  micro-economic  analysis  is  based  on  models  of  individual  and  household  behaviour 
using data from household surveys. The effects of the global economic crisis on households 
and individuals can be felt in terms of changes in employment opportunities and earnings, 
commodity prices, private and public income transfers, and the provision of public services. 
The extent to which such effects impact on household and individual welfare depends primarily 
on their income sources and consumption patterns. To make an appropriate micro-economic 
analysis we need to take account of the ability of households and individuals to adjust their 
consumption behaviour to changes in relative prices and household income, as well as to adjust 
their income-earning behaviour. 
 
A combination of the two methodologies is essential to capture the impacts of the global 
crisis on households and children in WCA and design adequate policy responses in a way that 
will also provide guidelines for targeting interventions in the most effective manner. The 
methodology followed to model the macro channels as well as the variables linking the macro 
to the micro model and the outcome variables for child well-being is described in detail in 
Bibi, Cockburn, Fofana and Tiberti (2010a). 
a.  Modelling the macro channels of the global economic recession  
The macroeconomic assessment of the global economic crisis on developing economies uses 
a CGE approach. A CGE model is a multi-market model of an economy based on real world 
data. The technique uses a system of mathematical equations that represent the behaviour of 
all  agents  (producers,  factors,  consumers,  government,  etc.)  in  a  market  economy, 
incorporating its specific institutional and structural characteristics. They are widely used to 
analyze the sectoral and distributional effects of external shocks and macro policies.
5 Most 
                                                           
5 They are primarily based on neoclassical theory of general equilibrium, first formulated by Léon Walras in 
1877 and later formalized by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1954, 1959, 1981). Improvements in   16
equations are derived from microeconomic theory specifying how agents adjust the quantities 
supplied and demanded in each market in response to price changes. There are also a few 
macroeconomic equations ensuring that the behaviours of economic agents are consistent 
with  macroeconomic  constraints.  The  resulting  model  is  then  used  as  a  "laboratory"  to 
conduct simulations of the impacts of shocks and policies to explore their respective impacts. 
 
The  CGE  framework  used  in  this  study  is  based  on  the  neoclassical-structuralist  general 
equilibrium theory. The model captures impacts on production, consumption, factor markets 
and prices in an economy in which agents adopt profit and welfare maximizing behaviour. 
Market prices adjust in order to reconcile endogenous supply and demand decisions, thus 
determining levels of production, employment and consumption. The model is adapted to 
capture  a  number  of  structural  features  of  the  studied  economies,  such  as  the  initial 
production structure, market segmentation and price rigidities. 
b.  Modelling of the linking variables in the macro model 
In order to assess the distributional and child welfare impacts of these shocks and eventual 
policy responses, we must first transmit changes in commodity and factor prices, as well as 
employment levels, to the micro level. Existing macro-micro models differ primarily in the 
type of effects examined and the mechanism used to links its two components. As described 
by Essama-Nssah et al. (2007), one can identify the following three types of effects to track 
the distributional impact of macroeconomic shocks and policies: the price effects or change in 
prices of factor endowments and purchased goods; the reallocation effects, i.e. change in the 
use  of  domestic  resources;  and  the  endowment  effects  or  change  in  the  availability  of 
resources. 
 
We propose to use a sequential “top-down” approach, following Robillard, Bourguignon, and 
Robinson  (2008),  to  link  the  macro  and  micro  components  of  our  analysis.  The  model 
attempts to capture the price and reallocation effects of the global financial and economic 
crisis.
6 The macro- and micro- models are run over a period of three years: 2009-2011. While 
this is suitable to capture most of the shocks associated with the global crisis at the macro-
level – i.e. trade and trade prices, FDI, foreign aid and some government policy responses – 
the  change  in  remittances  from  family  members  living  and  working  abroad  and  other 
government policy responses, such as the change in public transfers, can be simulated both at 
the macro- and the micro- levels. 
 
The global crisis could have quite complex distributional effects on households and children. 
The effects of the global economic crisis on households and their members can be felt in 
terms of changes in commodity and factor prices, employment opportunities and earnings, 
private and public income transfers, and the provision of public services. The extent to which 
such effects impact household and individual welfare depends primarily on their connection to 
the market, their factor endowments and consumption patterns, and their ability to adjust to the 
shocks through changes in their consumption patterns, labour supply and savings behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
data collection and advances in computer technology and software have enhanced their applications to applied 
policy analysis. 
6 We do not integrate the endowment effects according to the short perspective of the analysis.    17
While these impacts will be the focus of the micro analysis, it is important that the macro 
analysis simulates the impact of the crisis on the key variables driving this micro-economic 
behaviour: commodity price, wage rates, employment variations, non-labour income (figure 
10). 
c.  Modelling of the linking variables in the micro model and the outcome variables 
for child welfare 
The main objective of the analysis at the micro level is to assess the effects of the global 
economic  crisis  and  various  possible  policy  responses  on  different  dimensions  of  child 
welfare  in  Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon  and  Ghana  measured  by:  monetary  poverty,  caloric 
poverty (or “hunger”), school participation, child labour and access to health care services. 
 
Most poverty and inequality analysis is conducted at the household level. However, given our 
preoccupation  with  the  impacts  of  the  global  recession  on  children,  we  include  detailed 
information on all individuals in the micro model to analyze poverty and inequality effects at 
the individual level. We do not attempt to model intra-household allocation decisions and 
instead simply assume that consumption is shared equitably (proportionally to caloric needs) 
among members of each household. As a consequence, adults and children are considered to 
be monetary or caloric poor if they belong to a monetary or caloric poor household, i.e. a 
household for which per-adult equivalent consumption expenditure is less than the poverty 
line or the per adult equivalent daily calorie consumption is below 2450 kcal (for Burkina 
Faso a caloric poverty line of 2283 kcal is used as the food component in the monetary 
poverty line is based on this minimum caloric requirement, INSD 2009). 
 
Hereafter the methodologies followed to estimate the potential impact of the crisis on the 
different  dimensions  are  briefly  presented.  Changes  in  child  monetary  poverty  under  the 
different scenarios simulated in this analysis are captured through a Cobb-Douglas approach, 
using  household  specific  preferences  but  with  fixed  budget  shares.  A  more  sophisticated 
approach allowing for substitution effects, such as an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), 
was not possible with the available micro data.
7 Aggregate household consumption, deflated 
by a per adult equivalent scale based on minimum caloric needs and by relevant spatial and 
temporal deflators, is the variable used to assess changes in monetary poverty, according to 
country specific absolute poverty lines. Changes in real expenditure are affected by two main 
channels: income and consumer prices. Changes in total income are the result of the sum of 
changes in total income from: wages (affected by variations in both wage and employment 
rates);  self-employment  in  agriculture  and  non  agriculture  sectors;  transfers  (public  and 
private transfers and dividends). Changes in consumer prices affect real expenditures through 
household purchasing power. 
 
Child monetary poverty is measured by comparing each child’s real total expenditure to the 
expenditures required to satisfy his/her basic needs as reflected in the values of a typical 
consumption  basket  used  to  determine  the  national  poverty  line.  As  the  individual 
expenditure used to assess poverty changes over time and across the different scenarios is 
expressed in real terms (and thus varies with price changes), the official absolute poverty 
                                                           
7 A similar approach (Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System) was followed in Bibi et al. (2009).   18
lines for the three countries are kept at their initial official value. The child poverty rate 
(which is the main poverty measure shown and discussed below) is a measure indicating the 
percentage of the total child population living in households whose equivalent consumption is 
lower than the poverty line. 
 
The second dimension we analyze focuses on calorie consumption. Specifically, we define a 
child as suffering of hunger when her/his daily calorie intake is below 2450 kcal (or 2283 
kcal for Burkina Faso). As for hunger rates in the child population, nutritional tables specific 
to each country
8 are used to derive the caloric contribution of the principal food items and, 
based on the estimated individual food consumptions (household food consumption per adult 
equivalent), to calculate individual calorie intake for the base year and under the different 
scenarios simulated in our analysis. As for the monetary poverty analysis, a unitary model 
assigning  part  of  the  household  consumption  to  each  individual  proportional  to  their 
respective equivalence scales (based on age and sex) is used. Calorie intakes are affected 
across  the  different  scenarios  by  changes  in  household  income  (which  are  obtained  as 
described  before)  and  by  changes  in  food  prices,  as  they  modify  the  quantities  of  food 
consumed  in  the  Cobb-Douglas  formulation.  However  only  for  Cameroon  we  have  the 
suitable  data  to  fairly  appropriately  estimate  calorie  consumption.  Indeed,  the  household 
survey used for Cameroon provides the information (value and quantities consumed) required 
to calculate unit prices for every consumed food item, that is the price actually (or potentially, 
in case of self-consumption) paid by the household.
9 For the other two countries we were 
obliged to use a regional official price (distinguished by urban and rural areas) to get the 
quantity consumed by each household. This official price – collected by the country statistical 
office – is likely to be higher than the price actually paid by households as it is collected in 
major markets, covers only market-traded goods, and does not necessarily reflect the same 
quality of good as that actually consumed by the households, particularly poorer households. 
This  approach  may  clearly  overestimate  initial  hunger  rates  to  the  extent  that  it 
underestimates quantities actually consumed. Initial levels of hunger reported for Burkina 
Faso and Ghana should be then treated with caution, although the subsequent variations – 
which are our prime interest – should be less affected. The approach followed to simulate the 
impact  of  the  crisis  on  hunger  strictly  refers  to  caloric  intake  and  its  changes  over  the 
simulated  scenarios.  It  thus  does  not  pretend  to  give  a  fully  comprehensive  picture  of 
nutrition-related issues. It mainly aims at capturing potential changes in the food quantity 
(translated in changes in calorie intake) rather than changes in the diversity and the nutritional 
quality of food consumed by households and their children and looking at other nutritional 




Impacts  on  school  participation  and  child  labour  are  studied  simultaneously  through  an 
econometric model, where real expenditure is the variable through which the effects of the 
crisis  and  of  policy  responses  are  captured.  Other  individual,  household  and  community 
characteristics are inserted in the model as covariates and are assumed to be unaffected by the 
                                                           
8 Barikmo et al. (2004) for Burkina Faso and Cameroon; Eyeson and Ankrah (1975) for Ghana. 
9 As presented in Bibi et al. (2010a), a median price calculated at the district level was used. 
10 See the supplement, “The impact of climate change, the economic crisis, and the increase in food prices on 
malnutrition”, Journal of Nutrition, Volume 140, issue 1, January 2010 (in particular, Brinkman et al.).   19
crisis. Households are assumed to choose among four different situations for each school-age 
child: attending school and not working; attending school and working; working and not 
attending school; neither working nor attending school ("idle"). Where possible, child labour 
is constructed according to a definition where a child is considered to be a labourer if s/he 
spends at least one hour (14 hours if aged between 12 and 14 years) in economic work or 28 
hours in domestic work per week.
11 This is the definition used for Ghana and Cameroon, but 
not for Burkina Faso because of the lack of information from the household survey. Here, a 
child is defined as “labourer” if s/he does any economic related activities irrespective of the 
number of hours devoted to it. Domestic work is thus ignored here for lack of information. 
 
Similarly, we used an econometric model to simulate the effects of the different scenarios on 
the decision to consult a health service for an ill child and then, amongst children who do 
consult, the effects on the choice of type of the health facility consulted (grouped under four 
different categories according to the quality of their services). 
 
The effects of the crisis and policy responses on school participation, child labour and access 
to  health  services  are  captured  only  from  the  demand  side  (through  changes  in  real 
expenditure).  One  important  limitation  is  the  poor  quality  of  the  household  surveys  on 
information regarding the supply side determinants (i.e. detailed information on school and 
health facilities). 
 
A main goal of this analysis is to guide policy makers towards the adoption of effective 
policy responses that counteract the negative effects of the global economic crisis on child 
poverty. The characteristics of the interventions we propose are discussed below. A targeted 
cash transfer has significant and specific implications on the methodology also for the micro 
model: it is in fact on the micro side that we can identify poor children, predict their poverty 
status and target them for cash or in-kind transfers. 
 
A major challenge in applying a targeted cash transfer policy in the real world is to correctly 
identify  the  poor.  Due  to  the  lack  of  reliable  information  on  the  income  levels  of  the 
households, the government is required to predict their poverty status using a limited number 
of individual, household and geographic characteristics, which are easily observable by the 
government and not subject to manipulation by the individual. To do that we estimate the 
relationship between these characteristics and expenditures (per adult equivalent) observed in 
the household surveys. After the relationship is estimated, it is then possible to predict the 
individual expenditures and the individual poverty status of all individuals in our household 
survey  in  order  to  simulate  the  actual  implementation  of  the  policy.  By  comparing  the 
predicted and actual (according to the household survey expenditure data) poverty status of 
the survey households, we are able to evaluate likely targeting errors: namely under-coverage 
(poor individuals excluded from the social safety programme because predicted as non-poor) 
and leakage (non-poor individuals benefiting from transfers because erroneously identified as 
poor).  The  administrative  costs  faced  by  the  governments  to  put  in  place  the  policies 
proposed here are not taken into account and we thus only include the total amount of cash 
transfers allocated or the cost of the subsidies provided. 
                                                           
11 For the definition see also the statistical section (see “social protection” area) of  www.childinfo.org   20
 
The total amount transferred to predicted poor children is equal to 1 per cent of GDP in terms 
of the year of the household survey used for the micro-econometric analysis. We made the 
hypothesis that all the transfers received by children living in the same household are pooled 
and shared equitably among all the household members. As we cannot know what allocation 
rule is in force within each household, we adopted a relatively neutral approach. 
d.  Data 
Macroeconomic analysis 
 
CGE  models  are  operationalized  through  a  procedure  that  involves  calibrating  the  model 
parameters  such  that  the  model  exactly  reproduces  the  benchmark  situation  given  by  the 
Social  Accounting  Matrix  (SAM).  Therefore,  the  model  requires  a  benchmark  data  set 
presented in the form of a SAM. 
 
The SAM is the presentation of the national accounts in a condensed matrix form with an 
important property that the sum of the row elements is equal to the sum of the corresponding 
column elements. It is a consistent quantitative macroeconomic data framework representing 
the flows between different sectors and institutional units within an economy during a given 
period of time, in general, one year. The SAM is therefore consistent in the sense that it 
describes a general equilibrium of an economy.  
 
We use the most recent SAMs available for Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ghana, which date 
to 2004, 2003 and 2005, respectively. The global financial and economic crisis started when 
the  global  economy  was  still  facing  the  energy  and  food  crisis.  In  order  to  separate  the 
outcomes of these different crises and focus on the global economic crisis on children in 
West and Central Africa, the SAMs are updated to year 2008 using recent macroeconomic 
data and a cross-entropy method to balance the SAMs (Fofana, Cockburn and Lemelin 2005). 
Finally, the resulting SAMs are adjusted to account for an increasing category of workers 
and,  thus,  labour  market  segments  and  other  characteristics  required  in  analysing  the 
distributive impact of the global economic crisis on households and children. Below are list 
of the main features of these SAMS. 
 
Burkina Faso:  28 activities; 30 commodities; 2 factor earnings (wage and operating 
surplus); 8 Representative household categories ; 1 Government ; 1 Corporation; 1 Rest 
of the world 
Cameroon:  42 activities; 42 commodities; 4 factors earnings (unskilled, skilled, land, 
and other capital); 1 Representative household category; 1 Government ; 1 Corporation; 
1 Rest of the world 
Ghana:  56 activities; 59 commodities; 6 factors earnings (self-employment, unskilled, 
skilled,  land,  other  agric.  Capital,  non  agric.  capital);  2  Representative  household 
categories ; 1 Government ; 1 Corporation; 1 Rest of the world 
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Microeconomic analysis 
 
With  regard  to  the  micro  analysis,  we  used  the  latest  available  nationally  representative 
household surveys. These are the “Enquête sur les conditions de vie des ménages” (ECVM) 
carried  out  in  2003  in  Burkina  Faso,  the  “Troisième  Enquête  Cameroonaise  auprès  des 
Ménages” in 2007 (ECAM III) and the “Ghana Living Standard Survey” done in 2005/06 for 
Ghana. The “base-year” of our analyses is thus represented by the year in which the national 
surveys were carried out: 2003 for Burkina Faso, 2005/06 for Ghana and 2007 for Cameroon, 
and we made the hypothesis – strong but necessary in the absence of reliable data – that both 
the distribution and the level of consumption and revenues did not change between the year 
of the survey and the base year of our analysis. 
 
4.  SIMULATION SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
The  impact  of  the  global  economic  crisis  is  captured  through  the  four  main  channels  – 
external trade, private remittances, foreign investment, and international aid – that link these 
three  WCA  economies  to  the  global  economy.  Their  recent  trends  are  highlighted  and 
hypotheses are developed concerning the impacts of the economic crisis on those channels 
over the 2008-2011 period studied. Government expenditures are assumed to remain constant 
and  the  increase  in  government  deficit,  induced  by  the  fall  in  domestic  tax  revenue  and 
foreign aid inflows, is assumed to be compensated through increased domestic borrowing. 
a.  Simulation scenarios 
The July 2009 IMF report predicts stabilization by early 2010 and recovery beginning in the 
second half of 2011. On the basis of this information on the situation of the global economy, 
the study simulates the shocks introduced by the global crisis during the next three years with 
the following scenario: crisis in 2008/09, stabilization in 2009/10, and beginning of recovery 
in 2010/11. 
 
The  crisis  period  in  2008/09  is  characterized  by  a  contraction  in  all  linking  variables. 
Changes in world import prices are observed in IMF databases. The magnitude of the impact 
of the crisis on country-specific import prices is closely linked to the structure of the external 
trade in each country. Hypotheses are made on the changes in other linking variables based 
on  official  reports  published  by  the  IMF  (for  external  trade),  the  World  Bank  (for 
international remittances), the European Community (for international aid), and UNCTAD 
(for foreign investments). 
 
While other linking variables are assumed to remain at their 2008/09 levels with assumed 
stabilization of the crisis in 2009/10, commodity prices are expected nonetheless to increase, 
as is currently being observed in most commodity markets.  
 
The  world  economy  is  assumed  to  begin  recovery  from  the  global  economic  crisis  in 
2010/11. This translates into an increase in commodity prices and other macro variables, i.e.   22
export demand, foreign investments, development aid, and private transfers. The simulated 
growth rates in linking variables follow the trend observed during the pre-crisis period.
12  
 
Results  drawn  from  the  simulated  crisis  scenario  are  compared  to  a  simulated  scenario 
without crisis, called baseline or “Business as Usual” (BaU) scenario. This BaU scenario 
assumes that the changes in variables linking developing economies to the global economy 
follow their respective pre-crisis historical trends. Table 4 summarizes changes in the linking 
variables for the three countries studied. Details of these scenarios are provided in Annex II. 
 
Table 4: Changes in linking variables (per cent) 
 
Burkina Faso  Cameroon  Ghana 
2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Baseline (BaU) scenario 
World price of imports  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Export volume   4.0  3.6  3.3  5.0  4.6  4.7  12.3  12.0  11.4 
Foreign investments  10.5  9.6  8.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.0  9.9  9.0 
Foreign aid  7.4  6.9  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.7  2.7  2.6 
Private remittances  7.5  7.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.0  6.4  5.8 
Crisis scenario 
World price of imports  -18.1  4.9  4.9  -9.4  1.3  0.0  -19.2  10.1  10.2 
Export volume   -6.5  0.0  3.3  0.2  3.6  3.2  5.0  0.0  11.4 
Foreign investments  -42.0  0.0  8.9   -35.0*  -15.0*  5.0*  -42.0  0.0  9.0 
Foreign aid  -12.7  0.0  6.5  -5.0  -9.0  -6.0  -14.0  0.0  2.6 
Private remittances  -11.6  0.0  6.5  -12.5  -20.0  20.0  -11.6  0.0  5.8 
Source: authors’ calculation. See also Annex II 
Note: * Reserves 
b.  Child welfare in the baseline scenario (without crisis)
13 
·  Monetary poverty 
Child monetary poverty rates presented and discussed in this study are calculated using the 
national absolute poverty lines.
14 As national poverty lines differ across the three countries, 
any attempt at ranking the countries according to child monetary poverty rates is misleading. 
Burkina  Faso has a  child monetary poverty rate in the base  year equal to 32.7 per cent, 
Cameroon 50.2 per cent and Ghana 33.7 per cent. As for the poverty gap, Burkina Faso has a 
rate equal to 9.2 per cent, Cameroon 17.9 per cent and Ghana 11.2 per cent (table 5, Annex I). 
 
It is noteworthy that, when a relative poverty line (equal to 50 per cent of the median value of 
consumption) is used, child monetary poverty rates are 13.9 per cent in Burkina Faso, 30.6 
                                                           
12 The crisis period started in 2006 with energy crisis, followed up by a food crisis and then by the global 
financial and economic crisis.  
13 If the reader is interested by the absolute numbers of children affected in the scenarios presented in this study, 
then s/he can simply use the percentages shown and discussed hereafter in the main text together with the 
relevant absolute numbers reported in table 6 (Annex I). 
14 National poverty lines are 82,672 FCFA for Burkina Faso, 269,443 FCFA for Cameroon and 3,708,900 old 
Cedis (37.089 in new Cedis) for Ghana in terms of their respective survey years.   23
per cent in Ghana, and 20.8 per cent in Cameroon. If an absolute international (extreme) 
poverty line equal to 1.25 US$ 2005 PPP is used, child monetary poverty rates are 46.8 per 
cent in Burkina  Faso, 12.2 per cent in Ghana and 16.0 per  cent in Cameroon. When an 
absolute poverty line equal to 2 US$ 2005 PPP is used, child monetary poverty rates are 72.3 
per cent in Burkina Faso, 31.6 per cent in Ghana and 40.8 per cent in Cameroon. Although 
the two international absolute poverty lines proposed by the World Bank are widely debated, 
it clearly emerges that Burkina Faso has adopted a national absolute poverty line that is far 
below both and which thus needs to be revised, whereas Ghana has adopted an (upper bound) 
absolute poverty line very close to 2 US$ 2005 PPP, which also happens to be close to the 
relative poverty line above of 50 per cent of median consumption value, and Cameroon’s 
poverty line is closer to the 1.25 US$ standard. 
 
According to our analysis, in the absence of the global economic crisis only Ghana would 
have  continued  to  grow  at  a  fast  rate,  mainly  thanks  to  its  structural  and  institutional 
developments  in  early  2000s,  and,  consequently,  posted  impressive  reductions  in  child 
poverty (Figure 11). This is in line with the trend in poverty reduction observed in the early 
2000s.
15 In both Burkina Faso
16 and Cameroon, according to our simulations, in absence of 
the crisis, child monetary poverty does not fall significantly; indeed it slightly increases in 
2009 and 2010 in Burkina Faso. This is both due to their low GDP growth rates and to the 
higher  rates  of  inequality  in  Burkina  Faso  and  Cameroon.  Indeed,  the  Gini  coefficient, 
calculated for the child population based on per adult equivalent consumption, is around 47 











                                                           
15 Official national headcount poverty rate in 1991 was 51.7 per cent, in 1998 39.5 per cent and in 2005/06 28.5 
per cent (Ghana Statistical service 2007). 
16 When a per capita equivalence scale is used, national and child poverty rates are substantially higher than 
those estimated when a per adult equivalence scale based on minimum caloric needs is used, as in this analysis. 
We used an equivalence scale for comparative purposes in this study and also because we considered this to be 
more appropriate in a context such as that of Burkina Faso where more than half of expenditures are devoted to 
food and the number of children per household is dramatically high. For information, our national poverty rate 
(44 per cent), based on the latest available household survey (2003) and calculated with a per capita equivalence 
scale for the whole population, is very close to the official one (46.4 per cent) (World Development Indicators 
2009).   24







Burkina Faso (32.7) Cameroon (50.2) Ghana (33.7)
2009 2010 2011
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: changes are expressed as % difference with the base year rate. Numbers in parentheses refer to the base-
year values. 
 
·  Hunger 
Hunger rates among children in the base year are 64.9 per cent in Burkina Faso, 58.5 per cent 
in Ghana
17 and 35.8 per cent in Cameroon. As already discussed above, the lower rates in 
Cameroon might be at least partly due to the better quality of data used to calculate hunger 
rates. However, the simulated changes still give some rough basis for discussion. In terms of 
BaU hunger rates, figures for Cameroon are broadly in line with those for monetary poverty 
rates. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and, to a greater extent, Ghana show a trend in hunger 
rates to some extent different from that discussed above for monetary poverty (figure 12). 
Two explanations can be offered. First, the initial share of children who are calorically poor 
is around twice the share that is monetarily poor. Second, food prices increase faster than 
non-food prices in our BaU simulations, based on preceding trends. These results suggest to 
policy makers that improvements in monetary poverty do not necessarily imply a reduction in 










                                                           
17 This is in line with the figure reported by an IFPRI report, where the authors (Ahmed et al. 2007) show a 
hunger rate for the total population in Ghana in 1998 equal to 56.7 per cent. The methodology and the definition 
of “hunger” followed in the IFPRI report are the same as those used in this study. They only differ in the choice 
of caloric poverty line: the IFPRI study set the caloric poverty line at 2200 kcal, whereas we set it at 2450 kcal.   25








Burkina Faso (64.9) Cameroon (35.8) Ghana (58.5)
2009 2010 2011
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: changes are expressed as % difference with the base year rate. Numbers in brackets refer to the base-year 
values. 
·  School and work participation 
In terms of base-year school participation rates for children aged both 6-10 and 11-14 years 
old,  Burkina  Faso  (33-34  per  cent;  figures  13  and  14)  shows  a  tremendous  deficit,
18  in 
comparison with the other two countries (82-85 per cent in Cameroon and 83-86 per cent in 
Ghana). Yet, for children aged 6 to 10 years old, child work participation rates in Burkina 
Faso (44 per cent) are more comparable, especially with Ghana (39 per cent). Consequently, 
the share of children neither working nor attending school is also markedly higher in Burkina 
Faso for this age group. Among older children (11-14), the rate of involved in child labour in 
Burkina  Faso is almost twice that observed in the other countries despite the fact that it 














                                                           
18 However, the third wave of MICS data (micro data sponsored by UNICEF) carried out in 2006 show a 
substantial increase in net school enrolment (46 per cent) in primary education in Burkina Faso.   26
Figure 13: Simulated changes in school participation and child labour without crisis in 















Burkina Faso (S=34.3;L=43.8) Cameroon (S=81.9;L=31.8) Ghana (S=82.9;L=39.4)
     school       labour
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: changes are expressed as difference (in percentage points) compared to the base year rates. For Burkina 
Faso the sample is 7-10 years old. S=base-year school participation rates; L=base year child work participation 
rates. Numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values. 
 
Figure 14: Simulated changes in school participation and child labour without crisis in 
















Burkina Faso (S=33.4;L=56.2) Cameroon (S=84.9;L=30.8) Ghana (S=85.7;L=27.5)
     school       labour
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: changes are expressed as difference (in percentage points) with the base year rate. S=base-year school 
participation  rates;  L=base  year  child  work  participation  rates.  Numbers  in  brackets  refer  to  the  base-year 
values. 
 
As they are driven by changes in total expenditure, simulated changes in school participation 
and  child  labour  without  the  crisis  (BaU)  reflect  changes  in  monetary  poverty.  The 
simulations  show  that  school  participation  actually  declines  and  child  work  increases  in 
Burkina  Faso  in  2009  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  2010,  whereas  they  remain  practically 
unchanged in Cameroon (Figures 13 and 14). The increase in school participation over the 
three years in Ghana is evenly mixed between children who work and those who do not. The 
increase of those who both work and study is slightly more than balanced by the decrease in   27
the percentage of children only working, thus leading to a reduction in child labour though 
small. For older children, there is an increase in both school attendance and child work, as 
children move out of the "idle" category over time. An important policy indication may be 
already drawn here: whereas in Ghana and, a fortiori, in Cameroon the government may 
implement school-based social safety programmes (i.e. school feeding programmes) as a way 
to target the majority of children aged 6 to 14 years old, in Burkina similar policy responses 
would exclude around two thirds of school age children. 
 
·  Access to health services 
As for access to health services, if we look at the base-year values we find that ill children in 
Burkina Faso are more likely to consult a health facility than in Ghana and Cameroon (Figure 
15). If we disentangle this result by type of facility we see that in Ghana a higher percentage 
of consultations for ill children occur in hospitals or health clinics (more than 65 per cent), 
deemed as high to good quality health facilities, and only 4 per cent to traditional healers. In 
contrast, in Cameroon a relatively high percentage of ill children receive health services from 
traditional  practitioners.  Consistent  with  results  for  monetary  poverty,  our  simulations 
suggest that in the absence of the crisis, Burkina Faso would have registered a slight decrease 
in the demand for health services, while in Cameroon and, to a larger extent Ghana, there 
would have been an increase. 
 








hospital (18.0) any facility
(54.7)
hospital (4.9) any facility
(61.0)
hospital (29.9)
Burkina Faso Cameroon Ghana
2009 2010 2011
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: changes are expressed as difference (in percentage points) with the base year rate. Numbers in brackets 
refer to the base-year values. Categories of health facilities consulted by ill children and used in the analysis are 
(in order of quality):  
Burkina Faso: (1) national and regional hospitals, advanced medical centres; (2) private health practitioners, 
health NGOs; (3) centres for health and social promotion; (4) traditional healers 
Cameroon:  (1)  primary  and  provincial  hospitals;  (2)  district  hospital,  commune  health  centre,  health 
practitioner going to the sick person’s home; (3) drugstore, health clinic, school/work infirmary, health NGOs; 
(4) traditional healers, informal drug sellers 
Ghana: (1) hospitals; (2) clinic, mother and child clinic, maternity home; (3) pharmacy or chemical store; (4) 
consultant’s home, patient’s home or other   28
In the figure, in addition to any type of health facility (categories 1 to 4), results for category 1 are shown 
c.  Simulated macroeconomic impacts of the global economic crisis 
The global economic crisis slows economic growth in WCA 
 
The crisis slows down the economic growth prospects in Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ghana 
between 2009 and 2011 as depicted in table 5. GDP growth rates fall between 1.1 and 2.3 
percentage points relative to the BaU (no crisis) scenario in these countries in 2009. While 
growth rates increase in Cameroon in 2010, although still below their BaU levels, this is not 
the case in Burkina Faso and Ghana until 2011. 
 
The economic slowdown is most pronounced in Cameroon and Ghana. These countries ware 
predicted to grow respectively by 4 and 7 per cent in the absence of the crisis, whereas with 
the  crisis  they  are  expected  to  grow  at  rates  closer  to  2  and  5  per  cent  respectively.  In 
contrast, Burkina Faso is least affected, losing only 1 percentage point or less of growth in 
each year. Recovery comes quicker in Cameroon than in Burkina Faso and, in particular, 
Ghana. For the latter, the second year of the crisis appears to be even more damaging for the 
economy with a growth rate of 3.8 per cent. The hypothesis of early rebound for commodity 
prices as observed in most markets while other linking variables – export, FDI, aid, and 
remittances – are stagnating, exacerbate the adverse effects of the crisis.  
 
In  the  next  sections,  we  try  to  understand  the  disparities  between  these  economies  by 
highlighting their macroeconomic specificities. Thus, we start by decomposing their GDP 
components into final consumption, investment and net exports, and analyze their respective 
contributions to the economy slowdown consecutive to the global economic crisis. 
 
Table 5: Annual real GDP growth rates (per cent) 
Period 
Burkina Faso     Cameroon     Ghana 
BaU  Crisis  Variation*     BaU  Crisis  Variation*     BaU  Crisis  Variation* 
2009  5.3  4.1  -1.1  4.2  1.9  -2.3  7.3  5.1  -2.3 
2010  5  4  -1  4.2  3.1  -1.1  7.3  3.8  -3.5 
2011  4.9  4.4  -0.4     4.4  3.4  -1     7.4  6.5  -1 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note : * Percentage points (rounding). 
 
WCA  economy  benefits  from  the  trade  effect  of  the  global  economic  crisis,  but  this  is 
insufficient to counter-balance the decline in final consumption and investment 
 
The three economies studied benefit from falling import prices. Indeed, the trade deficits in 
Burkina Faso and in Ghana, respectively 15 per cent and 36 per cent of GDP in 2008 (Annex 
I, Table 2), are reduced due to a significant decrease in import costs (Figure 16). The trade 
surplus of Cameroon, representing 5 per cent of GDP in 2008 (Annex I, Table 2), increases 
(Figure 16). The most open economy, Ghana,  benefits most with its trade deficit (or net 
exports) experiencing a significant decline.   29
 
In contrast, investment and final consumption are falling in these economies and constitute 
the main cause for the reduction in their economic growth rates. Final consumption, which 
accounted for 79 per cent, 98 per cent and 103 per cent of GDP in 2008, respectively, in 
Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Ghana, is the main channel through which the crisis slows 
growth (Figure 16). Declining investment is also an important channel in Ghana. 
 
The  magnitude  of  the  decline  in  revenue  and,  consequently,  final  consumption  is  less 
important in Cameroon compared to Burkina Faso and Ghana, because of lesser external 
financial constraints – i.e. availability of reserves accumulated during the previous periods. 
However, the Cameroon economy benefits less from the positive trade effect because of the 
greater  fall  in  the  prices  of  energy  products.  If  Ghana's  favourable  terms  of  trade 
developments, associated with continuing strong export prices for its two main exports (gold 
and cocoa) and greater exposure to external trade, has contributed to substantially improve its 
trade  deficit,  the  importance  of  foreign  investment  in  the  country  renders  it  particularly 
vulnerable to its reduction during the crisis. 
 
Figure 16: Change in consumption, investment and net export to GDP ratios relative to 
BaU (percentage points)  
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: Cons.: Consumption; Invest.: Investment; Exp. : Exports. 
 
The loss of income due to the contraction of exports, foreign investments, development aid 
and remittances exceeds the decline in import costs, so that the purchasing power and final 
consumption of households experience a significant fall. 
 
Prices of goods and productive factors are measured in real terms using a consumer price 
index. Table 6 shows a relative increase in the average real price of imports and a relative fall 
in the average real price of exports. 
 
Export prices in Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ghana fall more than import prices in 2009 
(table 6). However, the decline in export volumes is less than that of import volumes for the 
same period. These results confirm Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009) in their conjecture that   30
developing country exports will be more affected by price shocks than volume shocks while 
the opposite is true for industrialized and emerging countries. The nature of the products 
exported by these two groups of countries is the main cause of this difference. Developing 
countries, including those covered by our analysis, mainly export agricultural and mining 
goods  to  industrialized  and  emerging  countries  whereas  they  mainly  import  from  these 
countries manufactured goods and services. 
 
Table 6: Quantity and price effects of the crisis 
  
Initial Intensity     Quantity variation (%)     Price variations (%) 
Import  Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Domestic  Producer  Value added 
Burkina 
2009  13.9  5.7  -20.4  -10.7  24.6  -6.8  -2.1  -2.4  -5.6 
2010  13.9  5.7  -17.5  -4  13.9  -2.7  -1.2  -1.2  -3.6 
2011  13.9  5.7  -7.2  -0.5  4.6  -1.4  -0.3  -0.3  -1.2 
Cameroon 
2009  11.8  13.1  -20.2  -4.8  25.2  -4.2  -0.1  -0.6  -5.1 
2010  11.8  13.1  -1.9  -1  1.4  2  0.2  0.4  0.2 
2011  11.8  13.1  0  -1.5  -1.1  0.2  0  0  0.2 
Ghana 
2009  39.2  27.5  -20.2  -7.3  2.9  -9  -6.4  -7  -9.9 
2010  39.2  27.5  -29.6  -12  12.9  -14.6  -9.4  -10.6  -20.1 
2011  39.2  27.5     -15.2  0     7.8  -7.4  -4.6  -5.3  -10.4 
Source: authors’ calculation  
Note: Import intensity is the initial (2008) ratio of import value to total domestic consumption; export intensity 
is  the  initial  ratio  of  export  value  to  total  domestic  production.  The  other  columns  present  the  percentage 
changes between the crisis and BaU scenarios. For each scenario, these represent the differences between the 
crisis and the BaU percentage variations, relative to 2008.  
 
The global economic downturn reduces factor prices and revenues in WCA. The fall in factor 
prices and incomes depends on the magnitude of the decline in export quantities and prices, 
as well as the openness to external trade. The rapid recovery of world prices compared to 
other linking variables exacerbates the fall in factor prices and revenues and delays economic 
recovery in economies presenting high external trade deficit. In contrast, economies that have 
recorded a trade surplus in recent  years benefit from the increasing world prices through 
faster recovery. 
 
Falling  export  prices  are  transmitted  to  domestic  producers  as  shown  in  table  6.  The 
magnitude of the fall in real production prices depends not only on the fall in export prices, 
but also on initial export intensities. Ghana experiences the largest decline in producer prices 
because  of  these  reasons.  It  is  followed  by  Burkina  Faso,  which  has  the  lowest  export 
intensity but suffers from a substantial decline in export prices. In contrast, producer prices 
change little in Cameroon. Factor prices, as reflected by value-added prices, follow a similar 
trend  with  Ghana  recording  the  largest  decline  in  2009,  followed  by  Burkina  Faso  and 
Cameroon. 
 
The fall in factor prices diminishes subsequently in Burkina Faso when the global economic 
crisis stabilizes. In contrast, the assumption of import price recovery in 2010 exacerbates the 
impact of the global economic crisis in Ghana, which has the highest import penetration rate.   31
The recovery in other linking variables – export volumes, investment, etc. – contributes to 
mitigate the adverse effect by 2011. The recovery in import and export prices in 2010 is 
beneficial to economic growth in Cameroon because of its initial trade surplus. Hence factor 
prices follow their non-crisis trends as early as 2010 in this country, although at lower levels. 
 
The global economic crisis hits WCA economies through a decline in foreign capital inflows 
particularly  in  countries  that  are  well  integrated  into  the  global  economy.  Government 
revenue and savings also fall with the global economy downturn. This is more pronounced 
when it is heavily dependent on taxes on external trade. 
 
The decline in total savings is largely driven by the (simulated) fall in foreign capital inflows. 
The impact is considerable on the Ghanaian economy, which initially showed a significant 
net flow of foreign investment – at 37 per cent of GDP compared to 11 per cent and -2 per 
cent of GDP, respectively, in Burkina Faso and Cameroon (Annex I, Table 3). The decline in 
foreign capital inflows compared to the scenario without crisis is more than 12 per cent in 
Ghana in 2009, compared to less than 4 per cent in Burkina Faso (Figure 17). In Cameroon, 
the study assumes a drawing down of reserves accumulated in previous periods that offsets 
this fall in foreign capital inflows. 
 
Figure 17: Change in savings to GDP ratios relative to BaU (percentage points)  
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
Table 7: Change in government revenues relative to BaU, Ghana (percentage points) 
              





income  Production  Consumption  Imports  Exports  Direct 
2009  -4.4  -2.5  -11.1  -10.0  -2.2  -16.7  -4.6  -6.0 
2010  -17.2  2.9  -9.8  -20.2  -6.6  -2.7  -9.6  -5.0 
2011  -4.7  3.2  -2.0  -3.7  -3.6  0.0  -4.2  -0.6 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
Public savings also deteriorate with the crisis. Once again, the largest impact is experienced 
in Ghana. In this country, the decline in public savings is entirely induced by the fall in   32
government revenue given the assumed rigidity of government per capita expenditure. Once 
again, this is due to a fall in external trade taxes and foreign aid (table 7). 
 
The global economic crisis increases the informality of employment in WCA. In economies 
that rely heavily on agricultural exports, the decline in formal employment and informal 
wages is more pronounced in rural than urban areas. In contrast, economies that are highly 
dependent on natural resource exports experience a greater contraction in urban than rural 
employment. 
 
The global economic crisis has important distributional effects dictated by the external trade 
structure of each country. The global economic crisis impacts differently on traded sectors 
depending on whether their main products are imported or exported. Agriculture products, 
with  low  income  elasticities,  and  non-agricultural  products,  which  have  higher  income 
elasticities, are also impacted differently. 
 
The decline in imports required to balance the current account in the face of falling export 
revenues benefits local import-competing products. This applies primarily to manufactured 
goods in WCA. In contrast, the decrease in export opportunities leads to increasing supply on 
domestic markets and a lowering of domestic prices for exportable goods. This concerns 
mostly agricultural products representing 68 per cent of total exports in Burkina Faso, 52 per 
cent in Ghana and only 24 per cent in Cameroon (Annex I, Table 4). In Cameroon, it is 
primarily natural resources – especially petroleum – that are exported. 
 
The decline in formal employment is most pronounced in Cameroon in the first year given 
that  the  main  export  sectors  employ  more  formal  than  informal  workers.  This  impact  is 
greatest  in  urban  areas,  as  this  is  where  these  sectors  are  primarily  located  (table  8).  In 
contrast, formal employment is more affected in rural than urban areas in Burkina Faso and 
Ghana,  as  these  economies  are  dominated  by  agriculture  exports  for  the  former,  and  the 
prices for the main non-agriculture export products (gold) evolve favourably for the latter. 
 
While  formal  employment  recovers  in  Cameroon  with  the  stabilization  and  economic 
recovery in the following years, it deteriorates in Ghana and Burkina Faso due to the high 
cost of imported inputs with the recovery of import prices, which penalizes more rural than 
urban employment. 
 
The excess supply of formal workers migrates to the informal market such that the latter 
increases in all three countries (table 8). This additional supply of labour on the informal 
market results in downward pressure on informal wages (table 9). Note that formal wage 
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Table 8: Change in employment relative to BaU (percentage points) 
 
  Formal  Informal 
  All  Rural  Urban 
unskilled 
Urban 





2009    -0.1  -0.7  0.5  0.6  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.2 
2010    -1.2  -1.8  -0.2  -1.3  0.5  0.7  0.1  0.5 
2011    -1.0  -1.6  0.0  -0.9  0.4  0.6  0.0  0.4 
Cameroon 
2009    -3.1  -2.3  -2.7  -4.5  2.5  0.1  4.6  6.2 
2010    -0.8  0.4  -0.9  -0.6  0.7  0.0  1.5  0.9 
2011    -0.7  0.8  -0.7  -0.6  0.6  0.0  1.3  0.9 
Ghana 
2009    -1.1  -6.0  0.5  -1.2  0.8  1.0  -3.3  1.0 
2010    -4.7  -13.7  -1.7  -4.8  3.4  2.6  10.4  3.8 
2011    -2.3  -4.4  -1.0  -2.5  1.7  1.2  4.2  2.0 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
Table 9: Change in informal real wage rates relative to BaU (percentage points) 
  All  Rural  Urban unskilled  Urban skilled 
Burkina Faso 
2009  -9.2  -10.4  -7.7  -6.5 
2010  -6.2  -6.6  -4.7  -6.8 
2011  -2.0  -1.8  -0.9  -3.3 
Cameroon 
2009  -8.5  -5.8  -11.6  -11.9 
2010  -1.2  -0.3  -2.6  -1.4 
2011  -0.5  0.6  -1.8  -1.3 
Ghana 
2009  -11.0  -10.2  -5.0  -14.1 
2010  -26.9  -27.7  -25.1  -25.2 
2011  -14.4  -15.7  -11.9  -11.6 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
d.  Simulated child welfare impacts of the global economic crisis 
￿  Monetary poverty 
The different extent to which the three countries are predicted to be affected by the economic 
crisis mirrors the socio-economic structural differences between them. First, while Cameroon 
and  Burkina  show  a  inverse-U  shaped  profile  of  child  monetary  poverty  over  the  period 
2009-2011  with  a  peak  in  2010,  in  Ghana  child  monetary  poverty  shows  a  continuously 
increasing trend. Indeed, Ghana is the country where children are predicted to suffer most 
from the global crisis, with monetary poverty increasing by more than 6 percentage points in 
2011 relative to the base year. Compared to the “business as usual” scenario, where monetary 
poverty  was  predicted  to  fall  in  Ghana  by  more  than  4  percentage  points  by  2011,  the 
potential impact of the crisis is even greater. 
 
Table 10 disaggregates the contribution of the different price and income channels affecting 
real  expenditure:  consumer  prices,  net  income  from  agriculture,  non-agricultural  self-
employment income, wages (by sector) and other income such as international remittances   34
and dividends. In Ghana, the deterioration is driven primarily by a reduction in consumer 
purchasing power as consumer prices increase, followed by a large drop in income in the 
non-agriculture sector. Increases in agricultural incomes offset the increase in child monetary 
poverty somewhat. 
 
In contrast, child poverty in Burkina Faso is mainly affected by the fall in incomes in the 
agriculture sector, where losses from sales are more than double the losses in terms of own-
production. Self-employment in the non-agriculture sector do not contribute to changes in 
child poverty, as only around 1 per cent of households get income from this sector. 
 
In Cameroon the impacts are more diffuse. Changes in consumer prices and the reduction in 
income from self-employment in the non-agriculture sector are the major contributors in the 
increase  of  child  poverty.  As  for  the  “consumer  prices”  component,  non-food  items  (not 
shown) are the main channel through which children are affected by the crisis. The fall in 
wages affect child poverty relatively more in Cameroon, representing roughly a sixth of total 
child monetary poverty increase.  
 
Table 10: Simulated impacts of crisis on child monetary poverty by channel 
      Burkina Faso    Cameroon    Ghana 
      2009  2010  2011    2009  2010  2011    2009  2010  2011 
base year (absolute rate)    32.66    50.20    33.73 
with crisis (% change to the base year)  3.79  4.67  4.36    1.85  2.04  2.01    1.52  6.10  6.65 
contribution to child poverty changes after crisis by different channels (% change to the base year) 
Consumer prices:    0.28  0.65  1.12    0.67  0.62  0.59    2.12  4.44  5.04 
Agriculture sector:    2.85  3.23  2.33    0.37  0.39  0.44    -1.77  -1.64  -2.37 
   sales      1.77  2.02  1.55    0.16  0.19  0.23    -1.22  -1.06  -1.67 
   own-production    0.76  0.93  0.54    0.15  0.17  0.17    -0.85  -0.84  -1.12 
   cost of inputs    -0.09  -0.13  -0.13    0.00  0.00  -0.01    0.00  -0.06  -0.11 
Non-agriculture sector (self-employment):  0.00  0.00  0.01    0.53  0.56  0.64    1.11  2.99  3.63 
Wages:    0.02  0.02  0.01    0.30  0.29  0.30    -0.08  0.08  0.07 
   formal      0.00  0.01  0.01    0.01  0.01  0.23    0.00  0.00  0.01 
   informal      0.02  0.01  0.00    0.29  0.28  0.28    -0.08  0.08  0.05 
Other income:    0.54  0.74  0.77    0.02  0.09  0.03    0.20  0.21  0.19 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: as changes in poverty status linked to the different channels do not necessarily affect all individuals, the 
sum of the changes in each component does not exactly equal the total change. 
 
Finally, the wage sector, which is not a major source of income in the region, contributes 
only  slightly  to  the  deterioration  in  monetary  poverty,  especially  in  Burkina  Faso.  It  is 
noteworthy that changes in the informal wage sector affected children relatively more than 
the formal sector, with the exception of Cameroon for 2011. Remittances do not seem to play 
a  crucial  role  in  the  predicted  increase  in  child  monetary  poverty,  as  relatively  few 
households rely upon international remittances. Only in Burkina Faso, where 6 per cent of 
individuals live in households receiving remittances (of which more than a quarter are poor), 
this channel plays much of a role, accounting for roughly one-sixth of the total change in   35
child monetary poverty (in 2011). In Cameroon and Ghana, again 6-7 per cent of people live 
in households who receive international remittances, but the vast majority (90 per cent) is 
non-poor so that the impact on child poverty is small. 
 
Table 11: Simulated contributions to crisis impacts on child monetary poverty by region 







2009  2010  2011  base year 
(%)  
2009  2010  2011 
difference (% points) to 
base year 
difference (% points) to 
base year 
Burkina Faso 
Centre  8.1  19.7  1.7  2.3  2.0  1.6  0.14  0.19  0.16 
Nord  9.2  45.6  2.5  3.2  3.2  4.2  0.23  0.29  0.29 
Centre Ouest  8.8  23.9  2.7  3.6  3.9  2.1  0.24  0.32  0.34 
Centre Est/Centre Sud  12.6  44.8  4.3  4.9  4.2  5.6  0.54  0.61  0.52 
Est  9.3  36.3  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.4  0.23  0.23  0.23 
Sahel  5.8  28.8  6.7  7.4  6.1  1.7  0.39  0.43  0.35 
Sud Ouest  5.3  28.9  5.5  7.2  6.7  1.5  0.29  0.38  0.35 
Boucle du Mouhoun  12.7  37.5  2.8  3.8  4.0  4.8  0.35  0.48  0.51 
Hauts Bassins/Cascades  13.6  21.1  3.7  4.6  5.0  2.9  0.50  0.63  0.68 
Centre Nord/Plateau central  14.6  33.7  6.1  7.6  6.3  4.9  0.89  1.11  0.91 
Rural  85.5  36.1  4.1  5.1  4.7  30.9  3.54  4.32  3.97 
Urban  14.5  12.3  1.8  2.4  2.7  1.8  0.26  0.35  0.39 
National  100.0  32.7  3.8  4.7  4.4  32.7  3.80  4.67  4.36 
Cameroon 
Douala  7.6  6.3  1.9  1.8  1.8  0.5  0.15  0.14  0.14 
Yaoundé  8.2  5.4  2.8  3.0  2.8  0.4  0.22  0.24  0.23 
Adamaoua  5.8  68.3  3.5  4.7  4.7  3.9  0.20  0.27  0.27 
Centre  6.8  45.8  3.6  3.5  3.4  3.1  0.24  0.24  0.23 
Est  5.0  67.7  1.0  0.7  0.7  3.4  0.05  0.03  0.03 
Extrême-Nord  20.8  75.2  1.4  1.4  1.3  15.7  0.28  0.30  0.28 
Littoral  2.9  31.1  2.5  2.7  2.3  0.9  0.07  0.08  0.07 
Nord  11.0  74.8  0.3  0.3  0.3  8.2  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Nord-Ouest  10.3  64.9  2.0  2.3  2.3  6.7  0.20  0.24  0.24 
Ouest  11.4  28.9  2.3  2.8  2.8  3.3  0.26  0.31  0.31 
Sud  3.5  35.4  0.6  0.6  1.5  1.2  0.02  0.02  0.05 
Sud-Ouest  6.8  42.2  1.6  1.8  1.8  2.9  0.11  0.12  0.12 
Rural  69.3  66.3  1.6  1.7  1.7  45.9  1.10  1.22  1.23 
Urban  30.7  13.9  2.5  2.7  2.6  4.3  0.75  0.81  0.78 
National  100.0  50.2  1.9  2.0  2.0  50.2  1.85  2.04  2.01 
Ghana 
Western  10.6  40.5  2.3  6.5  6.6  4.3  0.24  0.69  0.70 
Central  8.7  20.8  1.8  5.4  6.0  1.8  0.16  0.47  0.53 
Greater Accra  11.2  26.4  1.9  9.4  10.7  2.9  0.21  1.05  1.19 
Volta  7.6  26.6  2.4  10.5  11.0  2.0  0.18  0.80  0.83 
Eastern  13.1  15.8  1.9  6.6  7.9  2.1  0.25  0.87  1.04 
Ashanti  17.6  18.2  2.4  6.4  6.9  3.2  0.42  1.12  1.22 
Brong Ahafo  9.3  38.3  1.6  4.7  5.8  3.6  0.15  0.44  0.54 
Northern  13.2  56.7  -1.4  1.5  1.3  7.5  -0.19  0.19  0.17 
Upper East  4.9  69.9  1.7  7.5  6.8  3.4  0.09  0.37  0.33 
Upper west  3.7  77.9  0.0  2.6  2.6  2.9  -0.00  0.10  0.10 
Rural  65.5  39.7  0.9  4.5  4.4  26.0  0.60  2.94  2.89 
Urban  34.5  22.4  2.7  9.1  10.9  7.7  0.92  3.15  3.76 
National  100.0  33.7  1.5  6.1  6.6  33.7  1.52  6.10  6.65 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: absolute contribution to child poverty rate is calculated by weighting the headcount rates by the relevant 
population rates. 
 
Differences do also emerge in the regional and urban/rural impacts within the three countries 
(table 11). In Ghana, urban areas are more affected than rural areas by the economic crisis. In   36
fact, not only absolute increases are greater in urban areas but the absolute contribution to 
national headcount poverty rate rises more than in rural areas. This is due to the rise in 
agricultural incomes in rural areas, which partly offset the fall in other incomes and the rise in 
consumer  prices.  In  Cameroon,  absolute  changes  in  child  urban  poverty  rates  over  the 
simulated crisis period are around 1 percentage point larger than in rural areas, but high 
population  in  rural  areas  make  its  absolute  contribution  to  national  poverty  stronger.  In 
Burkina Faso the crisis mainly affects children living in rural areas. For example, more than 
90 per cent of the change in national child monetary poverty can be traced to rural areas, both 
because changes here are larger and because around 85 per cent of the child population live in 
rural areas. 
 
In Ghana the regions with the highest absolute contribution to the increase in child poverty 
are those where child poverty rates are amongst the lowest in the country (Greater Accra, 
Ashanti  and  Eastern  region).  This  result  roughly  conform  to  the  absolute  changes  in  the 
headcount poverty rate, with the only exception of the Volta region where children would 
experience a strong increase in poverty by up to 11 points in 2011. In Cameroon, regional 
contributions are more homogenous with the poorest region (Extreme-Nord) and the richest 
region  (Ouest)  making  the  largest  contributions,  although  it  is  in  Adamaoua  and  Centre 
regions where child poverty rate would face the largest absolute increases. In Burkina Faso, 
the rural region of Centre Nord/Plateau Central, as well as the regions of Sahel and Sud-
Ouest, are by far the most affected regions, whereas the Centre region (including the capital 
city of Ouagadougou) is where changes in absolute terms and in the contribution to child 
poverty are the lowest. 
￿  Hunger 
As shown by Figure 19, only Ghana is predicted to experience a serious deterioration in terms 
of children suffering hunger due to the crisis, a situation that worsens continuously over the 
period 2009-2011 such that hunger rates are a full 7 percentage points higher in 2011 in 
comparison to the base-year (2008). It is noteworthy that in Ghana hunger rates increase 
much  more  than  monetary  poverty  rates,  while  the  opposite  is  true  for  the  other  two 
countries. This is due to the fact that in Ghana food prices are predicted to increase much 
more than non-food prices whereas, in both Burkina and Cameroon, food prices decrease in 
comparison with non-food prices. In Cameroon, this difference between food/non-food price 
changes is such that hunger rates under the crisis are even slightly lower than those observed 
in the base-year. 
￿  School participation and child labour 
Younger school-age children (aged 6-10) are predicted to be more affected by the crisis in 
terms of school participation and child labour (Figures 20 and 21). Children in Burkina Faso, 
already with the lowest school participation rates, are the most affected with a reduction of up 
to 0.8 percentage points in school participation and an increase of their involvement in work 
of nearly 1.2 points. In decomposing these results, the situation is even worse: the fall in 
school participation is entirely driven by a reduction in the “school/no work” alternative, 
while the rise in child work is the result of an increase in the “no school/work” alternative. In 
Ghana,  while  school  participation  is  reduced  by  the  economic  crisis  (fall  of  up  to  one   37
percentage point), the impacts on child labour are much less. In Ghana, the decrease in school 
participation as a consequence of the crisis is driven both by a decrease in the number of 
children who combine school with labour and of those children who only work. School and 
labour  impacts  are  practically  nil  in  Cameroon  with  or  without  a  policy  response.  This 
suggests that, even more than in the other two countries, interventions should focus more on 
supply side policies in order to try to reach the relatively small number of children currently 
out of the school system.  
￿  Access to health services 
Ill children are less likely to access health services as a result of the crisis (figure 22). In 
Burkina Faso, the likelihood falls by up to 1.2 percentage points, whereas the impact is more 
modest, but still substantial in Cameroon and Ghana. An additional effect of the crisis is the 
diversion from higher to lower quality health services such as traditional practitioners and to 
greater recourse to self-care. In Burkina Faso, services supplied by the Centre de santé et de 
promotion sociale (CSPS), the most popular health facilities among Burkinabé children, are 
hardest hit, whereas in Ghana and in Cameroon, it is hospital-provided health services that 
fall most. 
e.  Policy responses to the global economic crisis 
The previous analysis shows that the magnitude of the impact of the global economic crisis 
on the transmission variables and the initial conditions of the economies in WCA are key 
parameters in determining the effects on child welfare in the region. The various monetary 
and fiscal stimulus programmes in advanced countries will contribute to restarting the global 
economy with positive effects on developing economies, but analysts agree on the fact that 
the return to growth will be unusually slow.
19 Therefore, the design and implementation of 
appropriate  economic  policies  in  response  to  the  crisis  will  considerably  contribute  to 
reducing its welfare cost, in particular for children. 
 
When government faces a tight budgetary constraint, a reduction in government current and 
investment spending and/or an increase in taxes are optional policies that can be undertaken 
to balance its budget. This is known as a pro-cyclical fiscal policy response.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  a  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy  response  would  be  composed  of  an 
increase in government spending on public services and/or a cut in taxes financed by external 
sources. 
 
However, most developing countries, including in WCA, find themselves in a position where 
it is impossible to engage in counter-cyclical policy responses to the crisis due to poor fiscal 
and monetary management during a period of growth (World Bank 2008). The result is that 
they have to adopt pro-cyclical policies aimed at reducing public spending and increasing tax 
revenues,  which  will  increase  the  short-term  vulnerability  of  the  national  economy  and 
exacerbate the effects of the crisis. The impact of tax increases would depend on their nature, 
income  taxes  being,  for  example,  generally  progressive,  whereas  sales  taxes  are  often 
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regressive. Spending cuts would tend to hit poor households disproportionately, as they rely 
more on public services. 
 
According to the World Bank review of past crises, social spending is generally pro-cyclical 
in  developing  countries,  increasing  in  periods  of  growth  and  falling  during  periods  of 
recession. The challenge for developing countries is therefore to formulate and implement 
temporary universal protection measures which would only be used by citizens who have 
fallen on hard times, and should cancel them when the economy improves and offers better 
opportunities (World Bank 2008).  
 
The macroeconomic policy response in developing countries could be monetary or fiscal. 
They could focus on goals to accelerate economic growth and/or aim to protect vulnerable 
populations, such as children. Fiscal policies aiming to achieve social protection could be 
designed to support consumption or income for individuals and their households.  
 
Social protection policies relevant for children may be grouped into three main categories: 
social insurance, which in some cases require contributions by the beneficiaries (e.g. health, 
unemployment,  old  age,  disability  and  asset  insurance);  social  assistance,  which  may  be 
universal or restricted to a targeted population (e.g. cash or in-kind transfers, vouchers for 
health,  education  or  food,  price/tax  subsidies  and  fee  waivers  in  health,  education  and 
housing); social welfare services, which are generally targeted to those with special needs 
(e.g. social workers, shelter and board, maternal and child health/nutrition programmes).  
 
The study quantifies the impact of two stimulus programmes aiming to protect children from 
the negative effects of the global economic crisis:  
 
- Consumption oriented  fiscal stimulus: Consumption tax cuts (VAT  or tariff) on 
food products. 
- Targeted  cash  transfers  to  poor  children/households  who  are  identified  using  a 
proxy-means  test  approach.
20  The  effectiveness  of  a  universal  cash  transfer  is  also 
discussed. 
 
The total amount transferred under each programme is arbitrary, fixed at 1 per cent of the 
national GDP in 2008. This amount is entirely financed from external sources (international 
aid)  by  assumption.  The  proposed  stimulus  packages  have  few  macroeconomic  effects, 
consequently our analysis in the next section focuses solely on the effects on child welfare. 
 
We  also  estimated  additional  country-specific  policies  that  were  proposed  and  discussed 
together with local committees. Detailed information on these policies and their impacts on 
child well-being can be found in Balma et al. (2010) for Burkina Faso, Bibi et al. (2010b) for 
Cameroon and Antwi-Asare et al. (2010) for Ghana. Specifically, they consist of:  
 
Burkina  Faso:  regionally-targeted  cash  transfers,  financed  through  an  endogenous 
increase in import tariff rates (internal financing) or through foreign aid, and cereal 
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price subsidies financed through foreign aid. The cost of the first policy is estimated to 
be equal to 0.4 per cent of GDP, while the second policy would cost 0.2 per cent of 
GDP.  
 
Cameroon: the elimination of customs on imported food items starting in 2009 and 
continuing through 2011, financed by reducing the rate of accumulation of foreign 
reserves, and the implementation of a school canteen programme in the regions where 
child  monetary  poverty  rates  are  above  the  national  rate  (50.2  per  cent).  The  first 
policy would cost an amount equal to 0.4 per cent of 2008 GDP. The second would 
amount to 0.19 per cent of 2008 GDP. The annual individual cost of the school feeding 
programme is calculated to be FCFA 10,230 in 2007 terms (FCFA 62 per meal over 
165  school  days  in  a  year).  The  meal  is  composed  as  under  the  World  Food 
Programme scheme (150 grams of rice, 30 grams of pulses and 10 grams of vegetable 
oil, equal to about 400 kcal per meal). 
 
Ghana: targeted cash transfers financed through a 20 per cent increase in tariffs on rice 
imports  and  an  endogenous  increase  in  tariffs  on  non-food  manufacturing  goods 
imports  or,  alternatively,  by  an  endogenous  increase  in  the  property  tax.  The  two 
financing mechanisms are both constructed in a way that the government is able to 
raise an amount equivalent to 0.5 per cent of GDP in base-year terms. 
 
As already mentioned above, the administrative costs of the policies simulated in this study 
are not taken into account. 
 
Regarding the other possible policies mentioned above, we also simulated the effects of pro-
cyclical policies (results are not shown here for lack of space) and, as expected, they largely 
contributed to a further worsening of child welfare in all three countries. In addition, the 
micro data available are not suitable to simulate the impacts of a reduction in the cost of 
access to health and educational services, which would also have gone beyond the scope of 
the current study. 
 
Consumption subsidies applied to basic necessities would give a certain level of protection to 
the poor (World Bank 2008). This is also the case for subsidies for agricultural inputs which 
stimulate agricultural production and improve rural income and the nutritional state of the 
population. Reducing the direct cost of access to health and educational services would also 
increase households’ use of these services.  
 
Public transfer programmes are potentially a good way to protect poor households from the 
negative effects of the global economic crisis by increasing the amount granted to individuals 
and their households and by fulfilling the eligibility criteria suggested by the World Bank 
(2008). As such, countries with programmes already in place before the crisis was triggered 
could  increase  them  with  the  goal  of  protecting  their  vulnerable  populations  from  the 
damaging effects of the crisis.
21 In countries where social safety net programmes are already 
in place before the crisis, it is much easier to intervene. However, only a relatively small 
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number of developing countries have already developed social safety nets (Lustig 2008): 19 
(out  of  49)  low-income  and  49  (out  of  95)  middle-income  countries  have  no  safety  net 
programmes at all. Specifically, with  a sample of 144 developing countries analyzed by 
Lustig,  16  low-income  and  37  middle-income  countries  have  cash  transfer  programmes; 
while  more  widespread  in  low-income  countries,  school  feeding  programmes  are 
implemented in only 24 of them. In addition, in most of the countries where cash transfers 
exist, both the coverage and the amount of benefits are dramatically low: Mendoza (2009) 
reports that a World Bank study reviewing social spending on safety nets in 87 developing 
and transition countries found that the mean spending on such programmes accounts for a 
mere 1.9 per cent of GDP (with a median value lower than 1.5 per cent), of which only a 
fourth is devoted, on average, to cash transfer programmes. 
 
From past crises there have been some lessons on how governments respond in order to 
minimize the effects of crises on children. For example, in response to the Asian financial 
crisis, Indonesia carried out the Jaring Pengamanan Sosial (Social Safety Nets Scholarships) 
and Argentina, during its debt crisis in 2002, put in place the Plan Jefes y Jefas, a programme 
of  cash  transfer  for  households  with  dependants  and  whose  household  head  became 
unemployed.   
f.  Simulated child welfare impacts of different policy responses 
￿    Monetary poverty 
Among the policy responses proposed to counteract the negative effects of the crisis on child 
welfare, a targeted cash transfer (following a proxy-means test approach) to predicted poor 
children is by far the most effective programme, particularly in Burkina Faso and Cameroon 
(Figure 18). With the same overall budget, which we assume to be equal to one per cent of 
base year GDP (financed by foreign aid), food subsidies have smaller effects, as they do not 
specifically  target  the  poor  or  children.  Indeed,  a  large  share  of  food  consumed  by  poor 
people is own-produced. A similar result was also found for Mali for a subsidy for selected 
food items: rice, vegetable oil and milk (Bibi et al., 2009). 
 
The effectiveness of these two policies differs across the countries. A price subsidy, while 
still much less effective than a cash transfer, has significant and positive effects in Burkina 
Faso, reducing monetary poverty by 2 percentage points by 2011 after the crisis, while in 
Ghana the effectiveness falls to up 1.2 points in 2010 and in Cameroon its impact is nil. 
 
Large differences also emerge in terms of the impacts of the cash transfer policy.
22 In Burkina 
Faso a targeted cash transfer fully offsets the negative effect of the crisis (with only a minor 
exception  in  2010).  Similar  results  are  found  for  Cameroon  where,  in  all  the  3  years 
simulated,  child  poverty  rates  are  lower  than  those  simulated  in  the  baseline  scenario, 
although the impacts of the crisis are predicted to be lower than in Burkina Faso. In Ghana, 
due to the strong predicted effects of the economic crisis on child poverty, a cash transfer 
                                                           
22 The individual transfer in Burkina Faso is 8628 FCFA, in Cameroon 20479 FCFA and in Ghana 19.8 new 
Ghana Cedis. In each case, the amount is calculated by dividing the total budget (equal to 1 per cent of base-
year GDP) by the number of children predicted to be poor in the country as a whole.   41
policy is not enough to fully offset, although poverty is still reduced by more than 2 points in 
each  year.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  poverty  gap  in  2009  is  even  lower  than 
observed in the base year.  
 
The weaker performance in Ghana is also due to the fact that the amount of the cash transfer 
only represents around 5 per cent of both the poverty line and the consumption of predicted 
poor children, while for Burkina Faso it is around 10 and 9 per cent respectively and in 
Cameroon it is around 7 per cent of both. The cash transfer in Burkina Faso also shows a 
higher impact because a much larger number of children, each receiving the cash transfer, 
live  in  poorer  households  compared  to  Cameroon  and  Ghana,  so  that  the  total  amount 
received by poorer households tends to be higher. 
 
Figure  18:  Effects  of policy  responses  on  child  monetary  poverty:  food  subsidy  and 
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Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values 
 
A final factor in determining the effectiveness of these two policy responses is the targeting 
performance of the cash transfer programme (table 12). Here, we found that Cameroon has 
the lowest rate of undercoverage (10.7 per cent nationwide), i.e. of poor children erroneously 
excluded from the programme by the proxy means test, and also the lowest rate of leakage. 
As the amount of transfer per child is equal to the total budget (1 per cent base-year GDP) 
divided by the number of predicted poor children, leakage to non-poor children reduces the 
amount received by poor children, whereas undercoverage excludes them completely. There 
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Table 12: Performance of proxy-means test in predicting poor children (national, urban 
and rural) 
   Predicted status 
  national  urban  rural 
Actual status   non-poor  poor  non-poor  poor  non-poor  poor 
Burkina Faso             
 non-poor  58.4  41.6  75.3  24.7  54.5  45.5 
 poor  24.0  76.0  20.2  79.8  24.2  75.8 
Cameroon              
 non-poor  63.3  36.7  73.8  26.2  51.4  48.6 
 poor  10.7  89.3  21.4  78.6  9.7  90.3 
Ghana             
 non-poor  62.9  37.1  60.9  39.1  64.2  35.8 
 poor  19.6  80.4  19.6  80.4  19.6  80.4 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: the model correctly predicts the real status of children when the actual and predicted statuses are the same 
(“non-poor/non-poor”; “poor/poor”). On the contrary, it fails when the statuses do not coincide, resulting in 
either leakage (actual status is “non-poor” and predicted status is “poor”) or undercoverage (actual status is 
“poor” and predicted status is “non-poor”) 
 
Table 13 suggests that the crisis draws a substantial share of children (up to 11.4 per cent in 
Ghana  by  2011)  into  poverty.  While  the  cash  transfer  is  more  successful  than  the  price 
subsidy in preventing this, it is noteworthy that the cash transfer also allows a substantial 
share of initially poor children to escape poverty. Thus, the children targeted by the cash 
transfer are not only those that fall into poverty as a result of the crisis, but also those that 
were already poor in the base year. There are very few "winners" from the crisis, as only a 
very small share of children escape poverty after the crisis.  
 
Table 13: Transition matrix of poverty status across the different simulated scenarios 
with respect to the base year 
   BaU  Crisis 
Crisis and Price 
Subsidy 




children  Base year  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Burkina 
Faso  Poor  Poor  Poor  Poor   
Non-poor  1.0  0.8  0.8  5.7  7.0  6.5  3.7  5.1  3..7  2.7  4.1  2.7  3,528,203 
Poor  100  98.9  97.6  99.9  99.8  99.9  99.6  99.7 99.70  93.6  94.4  94.2  1,710,876 
Cameroon                          
Non-poor  0.1  0.5  0.7  3.8  4.2  4.1  3.5  3.7  3.7  1.8  2.0  2.0  3,821,159 
Poor  99.6  99.3  99.2  99.9  99.9  100  99.9  100  100  97.1  97.1  97.2  3,852,064 
Ghana                           
Non-poor  1.6  2.9  3.9  3.6  10.1  11.4  2.6  8.6  10.5  2.6  7.4  9.0  5,990,092 
Poor  94.2  88.8  80.4  97.3  98.2  97.4  96.6  97.6  96.7  93.5  96.3  95.6  3,049,373 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: rows identify percentages of non-poor or poor children in the base year; columns identify poor children 
under the different simulated scenarios/years. By crossing rows and columns the reader can get the share of 
children who are non-poor in the base year and poor under any specific simulated scenario/year, and children 
who are poor in the base year and poor under any specific simulated scenario/year. 
 
Targeted  cash  transfers  require  time  and  institutional  capacity  to  implement.  Universal 
targeting is relatively easier to carry out and, at least in a first phase, may represent a more 
cost-effective  alternative,  particularly  where  some  wealthier  households  self-exclude 
themselves by deeming the amount of the transfer too small to collect. Table 14 reports child   43
monetary poverty rates when a universal transfer (with the same total budget as the targeted 
transfer discussed above: 1 per cent of GDP) is provided, but only to children younger than 6. 
We assume that this transfer is pooled with other household income and shared equitably 
among  household  members,  as  is  the  case  for  the  targeted  transfer  as  well.  As  the  total 
population of children aged 0 to 5 is smaller than the population of children aged 0 to 14 that 
are predicted to be poor (and thus targeted), the annual amount – in the survey’s year terms – 
transferred to  each individual child would thus be larger:  FCFA 11200 in Burkina Faso, 
FCFA 29300 in Cameroon and 30.6 new Cedis in Ghana. When the whole child population is 
analyzed, providing a universal cash transfer to all children aged 0 to 5 years old is very 
effective in reducing poverty rates after the crisis and gives results that are very close (and 
only slightly higher) to the scenario where we simulated a targeted cash transfer collected by 
all children predicted as poor. This good performance is due to the combination of a higher 
individual  transfer  and  of  the  elimination  of  the  undercoverage  errors  from  the  targeting 
approach. 
 
Table  14:  Child  monetary  poverty  rates  under  targeted  and  universal  transfer  (per 
cent), by different age groups 
  0-14 years old    0-5 years old 
  crisis  TT 0-14  UT 0-5   crisis  TT 0-14  UT 0-5 
Burkina Faso  base-year poverty rate: 32.7%    base-year poverty rate: 29.8% 
2009  36.5  32.4  32.9   33.8  29.6  29.2 
2010  37.3  33.6  33.9   34.6  30.7  30.3 
2011  37.0  32.6  33.0   34.3  29.7  29.3 
Cameroon   base-year poverty rate: 50.2%    base-year poverty rate: 47.4% 
2009  52.1  49.6  50.1   49.4  46.9  46.5 
2010  52.2  49.8  50.2   49.5  47.0  46.6 
2011  52.2  49.8  50.0   49.5  47.1  46.5 
Ghana  base-year poverty rate: 33.7%    base-year poverty rate: 31.3% 
2009  35.2  33.3  33.4   32.6  30.7  30.0 
2010  39.8  37.4  37.4   37.4  34.9  33.9 
2011  40.4  38.2  38.2   37.7  35.7  34.9 
Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: “TT 0-14” is for targeted cash transfer to all predicted poor children aged 0 to 14 years old;  
“UT 0-5” is for universal transfer for all children aged 0 to 5 years old. 
 
Specifically, under the universal approach, poverty rates are only 0.3-0.5 percentage points 
higher than under a targeted transfer in Burkina Faso, 0.2-0.5 points higher in Cameroon and 
0 to +0.1 in Ghana. Moreover, if we consider only children aged 0 to 5 years old, then the 
universal approach is predicted to produce better performances in terms of monetary poverty 
than the targeted approach: in particular, in Ghana poverty rates are up to 1 percentage point 
lower when a universal approach is followed. 
 
The cash transfer programme could also be integrated with a school feeding programme, 
starting with the most deprived districts in the country. In the case of Cameroon, a school 
feeding programme of this sort was estimated to cost the Government 0.19 per cent of GDP 
and lead to a decrease in both national monetary poverty and hunger rates for children by 0.6 
and 2.6 percentage points, respectively (see Bibi et al. 2010b). As mentioned above, a school   44
feeding programme in Burkina Faso would have a smaller impact, as school participation 
there is still very low. 
￿  Hunger 
The cash transfer is also very effective in reducing hunger rates, especially in Cameroon and 
in Burkina Faso, while  in Ghana there are no substantial differences between food price 
subsidies and targeted cash transfer (figure 19). In Cameroon, targeting cash transfers to poor 
children reduces hunger by more than 4 percentage points, while in Ghana and Burkina Faso 
the effects are more modest but still substantial.  
 
Figure 19: Effects of policy responses on child hunger: consumer  price subsidy and 
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Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values 
￿    School participation and child labour 
As for the other components analyzed above, a cash transfer appears to be relatively more 
effective as an anti-crisis tool (figure 20). This is particularly true for Burkina Faso, where 
school participation for children aged 7 to 10 years old increases by up to 0.5 percentage 
points  (entirely  through  the  “school/no-work”  alternative)  in  comparison  with  the  crisis, 
while the rate of children involved in some economic related activities decreases by up to 0.8 
percentage  points.  Those  moving  out  of  labour  partly  go  to  school  and  others  become 
inactive. 
 
In Ghana, thanks to the cash transfer, school participation for children aged 6 to 10 years old 
increases by up to 0.2 percentage points in comparison with the results under the crisis: here 
these children are fairly shared between the two alternatives with school. Even if the “no-
school/work” alternative decreases with the cash transfer, this is not enough to fully offset the 
increase in the “school/work” alternative and, as a consequence, this policy scenario keeps 
the  percentage  of  working  children  in  comparison  with  the  crisis  scenario  basically 
unchanged.  
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Finally,  in  Cameroon  school-age  children  result  to  be  not  significantly  affected  in  their 
decisions by the crisis or under the policy responses. This is mainly due to the very poorly 
significant  income  coefficients,  through  which  the  effects  simulated  under  the  various 
scenarios are captured.  
 
However,  this  and  other  demand-side  policies  will  be  most  effective  in  the  presence  of 
complementary improvements from the supply side
23 and alone they are clearly not able to 
change the state of children in terms of school participation. 
 
As for older children (aged 11 to 14), the effects are somewhat smaller, but generally follow 
the same pattern (figure 21). 
Figure 20: Effects of cash transfer on school participation and child labour for children 
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Source: authors’ calculation.  
Note: For Burkina Faso the sample is 7-10 years old.  
Numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values. 
Figure 21: Effects of cash transfer on school participation and child labour for children 
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Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values 
                                                           
23 This result is widely confirmed by Kakwani et al. (2006) who assess the impact of cash transfers for school 
age children in 15 African countries, even when a huge (and unrealistic) budget is devoted to this aim.   46
￿    Access to health services 
A targeted cash transfer policy is found to be very effective in offsetting the crisis impact in 
Burkina Faso and in Cameroon, but much less so in Ghana given the smaller relative size of 
the transfer and weaker estimated income effects (figure 22). More specifically, in Burkina 
Faso cash transfers more than halve the increase due to the crisis (which is around up to 1 
percentage point in 2011) registered for traditional healers by diverting most of these children 
towards the CSPS (Centre de santé et de promotion sociale) (an increase by  around 0.5 
percentage points in comparison with the crisis results) and, to a lower extent, towards private 
health facilities and public hospitals. 
 
Figure  22:  Effects  of  cash  transfer  on  access  to  health  services  (as  difference  -  in 
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Source: authors’ calculation 
Note: numbers in brackets refer to the base-year values. Categories of health facilities consulted by ill children 
and used in the analysis are (in order of service’s quality):  
Burkina Faso: (1) national and regional hospitals, advanced medical centres; (2) private health practitioners, 
health NGOs; (3) centres for health and social promotion; (4) traditional healers. 
Cameroon:  (1)  primary  and  provincial  hospitals;  (2)  district  hospital,  commune  health  centre,  health 
practitioner going to the sick person’s home; (3) pharmacy, health clinic, school/work infirmary, health NGOs; 
(4) traditional healers, informal sellers of medicines. 
Ghana: (1) hospitals; (2) clinic, mother and child clinic, maternity home; (3) pharmacy; (4) consultant’s home, 
patient’s home or other. 
In the figure, in addition to any type of health facility (categories 1 to 4), results for category 1 are shown. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The 2008/9 global financial and economic crisis, which exacerbates the impacts of the energy 
and  food  crises  that  immediately  preceded  it,  has  spread  to  the  developing  countries 
endangering recent gains in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. The effects of 
the crisis are likely to vary substantially between countries and between individuals within 
the same country. Children are among the most vulnerable population, particularly in a period   47
of crisis. Especially in least developed countries, where social safety net programmes are 
missing or poorly performing and public fiscal space is extremely limited, households with 
few economic opportunities are at a higher risk of falling into (monetary) poverty, suffering 
from  hunger,  removing  children  from  school  and  into  work,  and  losing  access  to  health 
services.  
 
This  study  simulates  the  impacts  of  the  global  economic  crisis  and  alternative  policy 
responses on different dimensions of child welfare in Western and Central Africa (WCA) 
over the period 2009-2011. It is based on country studies for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and 
Ghana, which broadly represent the diversity of economic conditions in WCA countries. In 
order  to  capture  the  complex  macro-economic  effects  of  the  crisis  and  the  various  policy 
responses – on trade, investment, remittances, aid flows, goods and factor markets – and to then 
trace  their  consequences  in  terms  of  child  welfare  –  monetary  poverty,  hunger  (caloric 
poverty), school participation, child labour, and access to health services – a combination of 
macro- and micro-analysis was adopted. 
 
The simulations suggest that the strongest effects are registered in terms of monetary poverty 
and hunger, although large differences between countries emerge. More moderate impacts are 
predicted in terms of school participation, child labour, and access to health care, although 
these are still significant and require urgent policy responses. 
 
Reductions in GDP growth rates are mainly attributable to a fall in investment and, to a much 
greater extent, final consumption. Benefits from falling import prices only partially offset the 
negative effects of reduced export prices and volumes, foreign direct investment, remittances 
and  foreign  aid.  Different  patterns  emerge  across  the  countries  under  analysis.  While 
Cameroon’s growth rate is predicted to begin to recover its pre-crisis rate already in 2010, 
according  to  our  simulations  we  need  to  wait  until  2011  to  see  economic  growth  start 
recovering in Ghana and Burkina Faso.  
 
This difference is essentially due to the economic structure of these economies: the expected 
recovery in import and export prices in 2010 is most beneficial to Cameroon because of its 
initial trade surplus. Ghana's economy is the most integrated into the global economy and is 
thus significantly hit by the predicted fall in foreign capital. Burkina Faso is affected by a 
more modest reduction in foreign capital inflows while Cameroon is able to draw on reserves 
accumulated  in  the  previous  years  to  offset  this  fall  in  foreign  capital  inflows.  All  three 
countries experience drops in formal sector employment and informal sector wage rates with 
Cameroon  showing  the  most  pronounced  movement  of  workers  from  the  formal  to  the 
informal sector.  
 
Ghana is the country where children are predicted to suffer most from the global crisis, with 
monetary poverty rates increasing by more than 6 percentage points. This decline is even 
more dramatic when compared to a reduction of more than 4 percentage points simulated in 
the absence of the crisis, such that the total effect is an increase of more than 10 percentage 
points by 2011 relative to the no-crisis scenario. Impacts in Burkina Faso and Cameroon are 
more  modest  at  roughly  and  4  and  2  percentage  points,  respectively.  In  Ghana,  this 
deterioration is driven primarily by a reduction in consumer purchasing power and by a large   48
drop in income in the non-agriculture sector. In contrast, child welfare in Burkina Faso is 
mainly  affected  by  the  fall  in  incomes  in  the  agriculture  sector  while,  in  Cameroon,  the 
impacts are more diffuse. In general, the effects on the wage sectors as well as on remittances 
generate  only  relatively  modest  adverse  impacts  on  child  poverty.  In  terms  of  absolute 
changes in child monetary poverty, in Burkina Faso children in rural areas are more affected 
than those living in urban areas, while in Cameroon and especially Ghana, monetary poverty 
for  children  living  in  urban  areas  is  predicted  to  increase  more.  In  all  countries  large 
interregional variations emerge. 
 
Children in Ghana are also the most severely affected in terms of hunger, with increases of 
almost 7 percentage points, compared to negligible effects in Burkina Faso and Cameroon. 
This is primarily due to the greater monetary poverty impacts already noted and the fact that 
food prices are predicted to increase much more than non-food prices in Ghana.  
 
Burkina Faso is the country where children are the most affected in terms of reduced school 
participation and, in particular, increased child labour. This is striking as school enrolment 
rates among school age children were already extremely low in Burkina Faso before the crisis 
(34 per cent, compared to 83 per cent in Cameroon and 84 per cent in Ghana) and child work 
participation was relatively high (49 per cent, compared to 31 per cent in Cameroon and 34 
per cent in Ghana), The effects are more severe for younger school age children (6/7 to 10 
years old), for whom enrolment rates are predicted to fall by nearly 1 percentage point in 
Burkina Faso and around 0.3 points in Ghana (negligibly in Cameroon) and child labour rates 
are  forecast  to  increase  by  roughly  1  percentage  point  in  Burkina  Faso  alone  (negligible 
effects in Cameroon and Ghana). Among older children (11-14 years old), only Burkina Faso 
is significantly affected with enrolment drops of about 0.5 percentage points and slightly 
greater increases in child labour activities. 
 
Children who become ill are also less likely to access health services as a result of the crisis 
and they are more likely to turn to lower quality health facilities. This result is observed in all 
3  countries,  with  the  largest  reduction  in  consultation  rates  (roughly  1  percentage  point) 
predicted for Burkina Faso. 
 
Among the policy  responses examined to counteract the negative effects of the crisis on 
children, a targeted cash transfer (following a proxy-means test approach) to predicted poor 
children is by far the most effective programme, particularly in Burkina Faso and Cameroon. 
With the same overall budget, which we assume to be financed by foreign aid and to be equal 
to  1  per  cent  of  GDP,  food  subsidies  have  on  average  smaller  effects,  as  they  do  not 
specifically target the poor or children. Broadly, the latter policy has a significant impact in 
Burkina Faso (only in terms of reducing the monetary poverty effect, by 2 percentage points) 
and, to a larger extent, in Ghana where it reduces child monetary poverty by up to more 2 
points and hunger rates by more than 1 point. 
 
The cash transfer is most effective in Burkina Faso where, as in Cameroon, it is able to fully 
offset the negative effects of the crisis on child monetary poverty. This policy is also very 
effective in reducing hunger among children in Burkina Faso and, particularly, Cameroon. 
Indeed, this policy is even able to reduce hunger by 3-4 percentage points in these countries   49
relative to our predictions in the absence of the crisis. In Ghana and Burkina Faso, the cash 
transfer roughly entirely offsets the effects of the crisis on school participation and child 
labour, while Cameroon has negligible effects as crisis impacts there were already negligible 
in this dimension. As we put no limits on the number of beneficiary children living in the 
same (poor) household, it follows that a cash transfer targeted to children is a progressive 
policy  response,  as  households  with  more  children,  which  are  usually  poorer,  benefit 
proportionately more. 
 
We should highlight that designing and implementing a cash transfer programme requires 
time and cannot represent an immediate response to the crisis. Only Ghana may be in a 
position to rapidly implement a cash transfer programme to respond to the crisis, as it may 
expand the existing Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme. Other 
interventions  (or  mix  of  policies)  might  be  more  cost-effective  in  the  short  run.  A 
combination of a universal or regionally targeted (starting with those regions where child 
poverty is more widespread) cash transfer programme for children aged 0 to 5 years old 
together with a school-feeding programme in poorer regions might represent an effective way 
to intervene quickly to improve child well-being. As discussed here, given the same amount 
of budget, a cash transfer provided universally to all children aged 0 to 5 is estimated to lead 
to child monetary poverty rates that are substantially similar to the case in which a cash 
transfer  is  targeted  to  all  children  (0  to  14  years  old)  predicted  as  poor,  by  relatively 
improving the situation of younger children. A universal approach such as that just mentioned 
would  in  fact  have  the  advantage  of  eliminating  undercoverage  error  of  the  targeting 
approach and the provide a higher individual transfer for younger children. 
 
In general, a note of caution regarding these results is in order, given that cash transfers and 
other  demand-side  policies  will  be  most  effective  in  the  presence  of  complementary 
improvements from the supply side.   50
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ANNEX I: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table 1: Country profile, 2008 (unless specified)  
  Burkina Faso  Ghana  Cameroon 
Population, total (millions)  15.2  23.4  18.9 
Population growth (annual %)  2.9  2.1  2.0 
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands)  274.0  238.5  475.4 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)  480.0  670.0  1,150.0 
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)  1,160.0  1,430.0  2,180.0 
Poverty (% of population below national poverty line)***  46.0  29.0  39.9 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  52.0*  57.0  50.0* 
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)  37.0  78.0  55.0* 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)  84.0  95.0  85.0* 
GDP (current US$) (billions)  8.0  16.1  23.4 
GDP growth (annual %)  4.5  6.2  3.9 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)  5.1  18.0  1.7 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)  33.3**  32.0  20.0 
Industry, value added (% of GDP)  22.4**  26.0  33.0 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)  44.4**  42.0  48.0 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  18.1**  32.0  19.0 
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (millions)  1,461.0*  4,479.0*  3,162.0* 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  24.4**  37.0  29.0 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)  26.8**  63.0  28.0 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (current US$) (millions)  50.0  128.0  167.0 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions)  600.0*  970.0*  433.0* 
Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) (millions)  930.0*  1,151.0*  1,933.0* 
Source:  World  Development  Indicators  database,  April  2009;  Country  profile  at  a  glance,  World  Bank, 
September 2008 Note: * = 2007; **=2006; *** Burkina Faso and Ghana, most recent estimate (latest year 
available,  2001-07);  Cameroon,  Country  brief,  World  Bank  (February  11,  2010)  available  at: 
http://web.worldbank.org. 
 
Table 2: Selected macroeconomic facts in 2008 (per cent of GDP) 
  Consumption  Investment  Net exports  Openness 
Burkina Faso  97.5  17.1  -15.8  34.0 
Cameroon  79.4  14.6  5.1  44.1 
Ghana  103.2  35.0  -36.9  117.1 
Source: Social Accounting Matrices, 2008 for Burkina Faso and Ghana, 2007 for Cameroon. 
 
Table 3: Savings (per cent of GDP) 
  Private  Public  Foreign 
Burkina  8.7  -0.8  10.8 
Cameroon  12.9  4.6  -2.1 
Ghana  1.8  -4.0  36.9 
Source: Social Accounting Matrices, 2008 for Burkina Faso and Ghana, 2007 for Cameroon.   54
Table 4: External trade structure (per cent) 
Cameroon    Burkina Faso     Ghana 
  Import  Export     Import Export     Import  Export 
Subsistence agriculture  0.4  1.3   Cereals  1.4  0.2   Cereals  0.5  0.0 
Commercial agriculture  0.0  4.7   Fruits and vegetables  0.0  0.3   Tubers  0.0  0.7 
Farming of animal  0.0  0.0   Other food products  0.4  0.1   Nuts  0.0  2.3 
Forestry  0.1  2.2   Cotton  0.2  0.0   Fruit  0.0  0.9 
Fishing  0.0  0.0   Other commercial agriculture  0.1  4.3   Vegetable  0.0  0.3 
Oil  28.7  43.2   Cattle  0.0  2.1   Meat  1.8  0.0 
Other mining and 
quarrying  2.0  0.0 
 
Other livestock  0.0  0.6 
 
Rice  3.9  0.0 
Meat and fish  2.1  0.2   Forestry  0.0  0.0   Plantain  0.0  0.0 
Grain mills  4.6  0.0   Fishing  0.0  0.0   Cocoa  0.0  27.5 
Cocoa, coffee, tea and 
sugar  1.0  0.9 
 
Mining and quarrying  0.4  2.7 
 
Other agriculture  1.7  0.6 
Oils and fats  0.5  0.0   Beverage and tobacco  2.8  0.9   Forestry  0.0  16.0 
Cereals  0.2  0.0   Textile  0.0  60.1   Fishing  0.0  3.8 
Dairy, fruits and vegetables  1.9  0.4   Electricity, gas, and water  0.0  0.0   Mining and quarrying  4.6  21.0 
Beverage  1.4  0.3   Other formal manufacturing   86.6  13.3   Food manufacturing  10.9  2.3 
Tobacco  0.4  0.0 
 
Informal manufacturing   0.0  3.2 
  Non food 
manufacturing  76.3  14.9 
Textile  2.6  0.5   Formal building and construction  0.0  0.0   Electricity,gas,water  0.2  0.0 
Leather  0.1  0.0   Informal building and construction  0.0  0.0   Building/construction  0.0  0.0 
Woods  0.0  15.4   Formal trade  0.0  0.0   Trade  0.0  0.0 
Paper  2.4  0.0   Informal trade  0.0  0.0   Reparation  0.0  9.8 
Petroleum  1.9  11.6   Formal transport  6.8  8.1   Transport  0.0  0.0 
Chemical  10.0  0.4   Informal transport  0.0  0.0   Communication  0.0  0.0 
Plastic  1.0  2.2   Telecommunication  0.3  1.0   Business services  0.0  0.0 
Non ferrous metal  1.6  0.6   Finance  0.1  0.0   Real estate  0.0  0.0 
Metal  7.9  5.3   Accommodation  0.0  0.0   Public services  0.0  0.0 
Machinery  11.6  0.1   Formal business  0.8  0.9   Education  0.0  0.0 
Equipment  1.2  0.0   Informal business  0.0  0.4   Health  0.0  0.0 
Transport  5.0  0.0   Semi-public services  0.0  1.5        
Furniture  0.4  0.0   Public services  0.0  0.0   All  100.0  100.0 
Electricity, gas, and water  0.0  0.0   All  100.0  100.0         
Building and construction  0.0  0.0                 
Trade  0.0  0.0                 
Reparation  0.0  0.0                 
Accommodation  0.4  0.4                 
Transport  3.7  5.1                 
Telecommunication  0.3  0.2                 
Finance  1.8  1.3                 
Real estate  0.0  0.0                 
Business services  4.7  3.5                 
Government services  0.0  0.0                 
Education  0.0  0.0                 
Health  0.0  0.0                 
Social services  0.0  0.0                 
All  100.0  100.0                 
Source: Social Accounting Matrices, 2008 for Burkina Faso and Ghana, 2007 for Cameroon 
Note: rates are expressed as percentage of total imports and exports respectively   55
Table 5: Poverty gap in the base year and changes in the simulated scenarios (in per 
cent) 
    Burkina Faso  Cameroon  Ghana 
base-year    9.2  17.9  11.2 
BaU 2009    0.4  0.0  -0.5 
BaU 2010    0.1  0.1  -0.7 
BaU 2011    -0.1  0.2  -1.0 
Crisis 2009    2.2  1.0  1.0 
Crisis 2010    2.7  1.1  2.7 
Crisis 2011    2.5  1.2  3.2 
Food Subsidy 2009    1.6  0.9  1.0 
Food Subsidy 2010    2.3  1.0  2.8 
Food Subsidy 2011    1.7  1.1  3.2 
Cash Transfer 2009    -0.3  -1.5  -0.3 
Cash Transfer 2010    0.2  -1.5  1.4 
Cash Transfer 2011    -0.3  -1.4  1.9 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
Note: values for the simulated scenarios are reported as percentage difference to the base-year value. 
 
Table 6: Absolute number of children, total and by age groups 
    children 0-14  children 0-5  children 6-10  children 11-14 
Burkina Faso  6,222,134  2,641,011  2,237,215  1,343,908 
Cameroon    7,813,425  3,449,030  2,674,214  1,690,182 
Ghana    9,276,320  3,588,388  3,311,598  2,376,335 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
   56
Table 7: Results of "proxy-means" regression to identify poor in Burkina Faso 
             Urban               Rural   
Regions         
Hauts Bassins  0.000     0.000  
Boucle du Mouhoun  0.029 ***    -0.136 *** 
Sahel  -0.010 ***    0.028 *** 
Est  0.281 ***    -0.103 *** 
Sud Ouest  -0.075 ***    0.050 *** 
Centre Nord  0.123 ***    0.009 * 
Centre Ouest  0.203 ***    0.047 *** 
Plateau central  0.000     -0.218 *** 
Nord  0.043 **    -0.263 *** 
Centre Est  0.008 ***    -0.189 *** 
Centre  0.036 ***    -0.341 *** 
Cascades  -0.081 ***    -0.090 *** 
Centre Sud  0.000     -0.360 *** 
hh_ageabove14  -0.063 ***    -0.032 *** 
hh_agebelow15  -0.053 ***    -0.035 *** 
Lotie  0.057 ***    0.000  
Toilet  0.375 ***    1.121 *** 
Floor  0.197 ***    0.210 *** 
Wall  0.209 ***    0.085 *** 
Roof  0.018 ***    0.021 *** 
Electricity  0.298 ***    0.056 *** 
Water  0.247 ***    0.311 *** 
n_rooms  0.404 ***    0.278 *** 
Automobile  0.354 ***    0.139 *** 
Motorcycle  0.299 ***    0.295 *** 
Distance  0.045 ***    0.044 *** 
Constant  11.133 ***     11.453 *** 
"cut-off point”  11.322             11.322 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EBCVM 2003. 
Notes:  
·  Dependent variable: logarithm of total household expenditure (per adult equivalent) divided by the relevant 
regional price deflator  
·  Econometric model: quantile regressions set at 0.11 for urban areas and at 0.30 for rural areas 
·  Coefficients significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) level 
·  Pseudo R
2 for “urban” 0.35; for “rural” 0.10 
·  The “cut-off point” is in logarithmic form and corresponds to 82672 FCFA, the 2003 poverty line 
·  To identify the individuals who are poor, it is sufficient to multiply the variables for each household by 
their  respective  coefficients.  If  the  total  sum  is  less  than  11.322  the  household  is  considered  as  poor, 
otherwise it is considered as non poor. 
Key: 
Regions = binary variables for each region with labels “Haut Bassins” (the comparison category) to “Centre 
Sud” 
hh_ageabove14 = number of household members aged 15 and over 
hh_agebelow15 = number of household members aged 14 and under  
lotie = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a lotie residence zone; 0 otherwise 
toilet = binary variable equal to 1 if household as a private flush toilet; 0 otherwise 
floor = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or tiled floor; 0 otherwise   
wall = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or brick walls; 0 otherwise 
roof = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement/sheet metal roof; 0 otherwise 
electricity = binary equal to 1 if household lives in a house with electricity; 0 otherwise 
water = binary equal to 1 if household has access to own or shared drinkable water; 0 otherwise 
n_rooms = number of rooms per household member 
automobile = binary equal to 1 if household has an automobile; 0 otherwise 
moto = binary equal to 1 if household has a motorcycle; 0 otherwise 
distance = binary equal to 1 if household lives 15 minutes or less from public transport; 0 otherwise   57
 
Table 8: Results of "proxy-means" regression to identify poor in Cameroon 
             Urban                Rural   
Regions         
Douala  0.000     0.000  
Yaoundé  0.054 ***    0.000  
Adamaoua  -0.170 ***    -0.177 *** 
Centre  -0.166 ***    -0.121 *** 
Est  -0.102 ***    -0.178 *** 
Extrême-Nord  -0.088 ***    -0.326 *** 
Littoral  -0.347 ***    -0.053 *** 
Nord  -0.143 ***    -0.263 *** 
Nord-Ouest  -0.359 ***    -0.348 *** 
Ouest  -0.116 ***    0.015  
Sud  -0.049 ***    0.000  
Sud-Ouest  -0.140 ***    -0.079 *** 
hh_ageabove14  -0.058 ***    -0.053 *** 
hh_agebelow15  -0.097 ***    -0.052 *** 
Toilet  0.120 ***    0.106 *** 
Floor  0.094 ***    0.117 *** 
Wall  0.122 ***    0.080 *** 
Roof  0.110 ***    0.170 *** 
Electricity  0.273 ***    0.156 *** 
Water  0.250 ***    0.297 *** 
n_rooms  0.017 ***    0.092 *** 
Automobile  0.551 ***    0.660 *** 
Motorcycle  0.188 ***    0.306 *** 
Distance  0.025 **    0.034 *** 
Constant  12.501 ***     12.500 *** 
"cut-off point”  12.504    12.504 
Source: Authors’ calculations from ECAM III 2007 
Notes:  
·  Dependent variable: logarithm of total household expenditure (per adult equivalent) divided by the relevant 
regional price deflator  
·  Econometric model: quantile regressions set at 0.11 for urban areas and at 0.42 for rural areas 
·  Coefficients significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) level 
·  Pseudo R
2 for “urban” 0.26; for “rural” 0.26 
·  The “cut-off point” is expressed in logarithmic form and corresponds to 269,443 (FCFA), the poverty line 
for 2007 
·  To identify the individuals who are poor, it is sufficient to multiply the variables for each household by 
their  respective  coefficients.  If  the  total  sum  is  less  than  12.504  the  household  is  considered  as  poor, 
otherwise it is considered as non poor. 
Key: 
Regions = binary variables for each region with labels “Douala” (the comparison category) to “Sud-Ouest” 
hh_ageabove14 = number of household members aged 15 and over 
hh_agebelow15 = number of household members aged 14 and under  
toilet = binary variable equal to 1 if household as a private flush toilet/improved latrine; 0 otherwise 
floor = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or tiled floor; 0 otherwise   
wall = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or brick walls; 0 otherwise 
roof = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or sheet metal roof; 0 otherwise 
electricity = binary equal to 1 if household lives in a house with electricity; 0 otherwise 
water = binary equal to 1 if household has access to own tap (snec) for drinkable water; 0 otherwise 
n_rooms = number of rooms per household member 
automobile = binary equal to 1 if household has an automobile; 0 otherwise 
moto = binary equal to 1 if household has a motorcycle; 0 otherwise 
distance = binary equal to 1 if household lives less than 3 km from the paved road if urban or less than 6 km if 
rural; 0 otherwise   58
 
Table 9: Results of the "proxy-means" regression to identify poor individuals in Ghana 
             Urban               Rural   
Regions         
Western  0.000     0.000  
Central  0.350 ***    0.363 *** 
Greater Accra  -0.066 *    0.000 *** 
Volta  0.301 ***    0.086 *** 
Eastern  0.188 ***    0.338 *** 
Astanti  0.345 ***    0.358 *** 
Brong Ahafo  0.305 ***    0.000  
Northern  0.000     -0.300 *** 
Upper East  0.000     -0.527 *** 
Upper West  -0.469 ***    -0.572 *** 
hh_ageabove14  -0.116 ***    -0.040 *** 
hh_agebelow15  -0.064 ***    -0.050 *** 
hh_size_2  0.000     0.000  
hh_size_3  -0.147 ***    0.000  
hh_size_4  -0.140 ***    0.000  
hh_size_5  -0.239 ***    0.000  
hh_size_6  -0.184 ***    0.000  
Education_hh_head  -0.256 ***    -0.129 *** 
Wall  0.207 ***    0.061 ** 
Roof  0.000     -0.069 *** 
Electricity  0.558 ***    0.049 ** 
Water  0.000     0.332 *** 
Kerosene  0.311 ***    0.000  
n_rooms  0.252 ***    0.585 *** 
Automobile  0.677 ***    0.000  
Motorcycle  0.000     0.568 *** 
Constant  15.113 ***     15.148 *** 
"cut-off point”  12.504              12.504 
Source: Authors’ calculations from GLSS 2005/06 
Note:  
· Dependent variable: logarithm of total household expenditure (per adult equivalent) divided by the relevant 
regional price deflator  
· Econometric model: quantile regressions set at 0.174 for urban areas and at 0.30 for rural areas 
· Coefficients significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) level 
· Pseudo R
2 for “urban” 0.24; for “rural” 0.24 
· The “cut-off point” is in log form and corresponds to 3708900 old Ghana cedis, the 2005/6 poverty line 
· To  identify  the  poor,  it  is  sufficient  to  multiply  the  variables  for  each  household  by  their  respective 
coefficients. If the total sum is less than 15.126 the household is considered as poor. 
· In order to apply these estimated coefficients in the new monetary regime using the new Ghana cedis, all that 
is required is to divide the poverty line by 10’000 and get the new cut-off point in log terms (= 5.916) 
Key: 
Regions = binary variables for each region taking label “Western” (the comparison category) to “Upper West” 
hh_ageabove14 = number of household members aged 15 and over 
hh_agebelow15 = number of household members aged 14 and under  
hh_size = binary variables for number of household members. “hh_size_6” is for 6 or more 
education_hh_head = binary variable equal to 1 if household head had no education or only MSLC (urban) 
wall = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or sandcrete walls; 0 otherwise 
roof = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a roof in leaves; 0 otherwise 
electricity = binary equal to 1 if household lives in a house with electricity; 0 otherwise 
water = binary equal to 1 if household has access to own source of water; 0 otherwise 
kerosene = binary equal to 1 if household uses kerosene as main source of lighting; 0 otherwise 
n_rooms = number of rooms per household member 
automobile = binary equal to 1 if household has an automobile; 0 otherwise 
moto = binary equal to 1 if household has a motorcycle; 0 otherwise   59
ANNEX II: SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
Aid  and  development  assistance,  international  remittances,  and  external  trade  (prices  and 
volumes)  are  identified  as  the  main  transmission  channels  of  the  economic  crisis  to 
developing  countries.  Hypotheses  on  the  future  evolvement  of  these  variables  form  the 
scenarios simulated in the study. Their recent trends are highlighted and scenarios on their 
variations are made for future periods. 
 
The  study  simulates  two  sets  of  hypotheses:  the  baseline  and  the  crisis  scenarios.  The 
baseline scenario, also called the scenario without crisis or the “business as usual” scenario 
(BaU) is based on the hypothesis that the changes in variables linking developing economies 
to the global economy follow recent pre-crisis trends. According to its July 2009 report, the 
IMF forecasts an uneven stabilization and slow recovery of the global economy. On the basis 
of this information on the situation of the global economy, our crisis scenario assumes: a 
crisis  in  2008/2009;  a  stabilization  of  the  crisis  in  2009/2010  with  a  rebound  of  import 
commodity prices in the second half of 2009 (charts 6, 7 and 8); and a recovery in the second 
half  of  2010  for  the  macro  variables,  i.e.  FDI,  aid  and  development  assistance,  private 
transfers and exports. The following sections discuss these scenarios in detail. 
·  Foreign investments 
In  the  baseline  scenario,  recent  statistics  on  country-specific  FDI  flows  for  Ghana  and 
Burkina Faso (represented by the black curve in figures 1 and 2 are used to make projection 
on  their  future  trend  (represented  by  the  blue  curve  in  figures  1  and  2.  Therefore,  we 
projected that, in the absence of the crisis, foreign investments would have grown annually 
between 9 and 11 per cent for both Ghana and Burkina Faso (table 1). For Cameroon, we 
assume that the FDIs grow at an average rate of 5.9 per cent derived from a macroeconomic 




According to the UNCTAD Investment Report, FDI fell by 15 per cent in 2008 and a similar 
trend  is  expected  for  2009  if  one  refers  to  the  recent  downward  trend  in  "Mergers  and 
Acquisitions",  a  main  component  of  FDI  (figure  2).  In  the  crisis  scenario  (table  1),  the 
changes  in  "Mergers  and  Acquisitions"  between  the  first  quarters  of  2008  and  2009  are 
adopted to predict the effects of the crisis during the first period (2008-09), i.e. a 42 per cent 
fall for both Burkina Faso and Ghana. It is then assumed that FDI flows stagnate in the 
second period (2009-10), and resume the country pre-crisis growth trend in the third period 
(2010-11),  around  9  per  cent.  According  to  forecasts  by  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and 
Planning in Cameroon (MINEPAT/DGEPIP/DAPE 2009), the growth rate of FDI projected 




                                                           
24 MINEPAT/DGEPIP/DAPE. 2009. « Cadrage macroéconomique dynamique du Compte d’opérations 
financières ». Republic of Cameroon.   60
Table 1: Foreign investment, annual percentage change 
  Baseline  Crisis 
  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Burkina Faso  10.5  9.6  8.9  -42.0  0.0  8.9 
Cameroon  5.9  5.9  5.9  0.0  5.26  2.8 
Ghana  11.0  9.9  9.0  -42.0  0.0  9.0 
Source: Authors’ elaborations 
 
Figure 1: FDI baseline scenario, Burkina Faso (Billions, CFA Franc) 
 
Source : Data from "Direction Generale de l'Economie et de la Planification". Note : R
2 = 0.57 
 
Figure 2: FDI baseline scenario, Ghana (Millions US$) 
 
Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2009). Note: R
2 = 0.79 
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Figure 3: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Billions US$) 
 
Source: UNCTAD report (April 2009) 
·  Aid and development assistance 
Projections on the changes in aid flows follow the pre-crisis trend in the BaU scenario, as 
described above (figure 4).
25 Thus we project average growth rates of aid flows of 7 per cent 
in Burkina Faso and 3 per cent in Ghana (table 2). For Burkina Faso and Ghana, the crisis 
scenarios are based on forecasts made by the European Report on Development (October 
2009) and presented in table 2. Aid flows and development assistance are expected to fall by 
13 and 14 per cent respectively for Burkina Faso and Ghana in the period 2008/09. After 
stagnation in period 2009/10, we forecast a rebound in 2010/11 to the trends of 7 and 3 per 
cent, respectively. For Cameroon, forecasts by the Ministry of Economy and Planning do not 
concern aid trends. Public grants are expected to grow by 19 per cent before collapsing by 17 
and 12 per cent in 2010 and 2011, in both the BaU and crisis scenarios. 
 
Table 2: Aid flows, annual percentage change  
  Baseline  Crisis 
  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Burkina Faso  7.4  6.9  6.5  -12.7  0.0  6.5 
Cameroon  19.0  -17.2  -12.2  19.0  -17.2  -12.2 
Ghana  2.7  2.7  2.6  -14.0  0.0  2.6 
Source: Crisis scenario in Burkina Faso and Ghana from European Report on Development (October 2009). 
                                                           
25 The distributions that best fit the data show r-squares equal to 0.87 and 0.26, respectively, for Burkina Faso 
and Ghana.   62
Figure 4: Aid and development assistance, Burkina Faso (Millions US$) 
 
Source: see table 2 
Note: R
2 = 0.98 
 
Figure 5: Aid and development assistance, Ghana (Millions US$) 
 
Source: see table 2 
Note: R
2 = 0.26 
·  International remittances 
In the same vein, baseline projections for remittances follow the pre-crisis trend as portrayed 
in figures 6 and 7 with annual increases averaging around 6 and 7 per cent in Burkina Faso 
and Ghana. For Cameroon, we assume stagnation in continuation of the pre-crisis trend based 
on the 2007 and 2008 figures from the online World Bank remittances database. 
 
The crisis scenario for Burkina Faso and Ghana is based on the low case forecasts made by 
the World Bank report on remittances, i.e. a reduction by 11.6 per cent in period 2008-09 
(table  3).  Then,  international  remittances  stagnate  in  2009-10  and  rebound  in  2010-11 
following  the  pre-crisis  trend  (around  6  per  cent).  For  the  case  of  Cameroon,  the  crisis   63
scenario is based on forecasts by the Ministry of Economy and Planning, i.e. a 25.3 per cent 
reduction in 2009 and another reduction by 39 per cent in 2010, followed by a 69.9 per cent 
increase in 2011. 
 
Table 3: International remittances, annual percentage change 
  Baseline  Crisis 
  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Burkina Faso  7.5  7.0  6.5  -11.6  0.0  6.5 
Cameroon (*)  0.0  0.0  0.0  -25.3  -39.2  69.9 
Ghana  7.0  6.4  5.8  -11.6  0.0  5.8 
Source: Crisis scenario in Burkina Faso and Ghana from World Bank report on remittances, low case forecast 
(July  2009).  Crisis  scenario  in  Cameroon:  forecast  of  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Planning 
(MINEPAT/DGEPIP/DAPE 2009). 
 
Figure 6: International remittances, Burkina Faso (Millions US$) 
 
Source: see table 3 
Note: R
2 = 0.67 
 
Figure 7: International remittances, Ghana (Millions US$) 
 
Source: see table 3 
Note: R
2 = 0.95   64
Figure 8: Forecast of international remittances, Cameroon (Billions of CFA francs) 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning (MINEPAT/DGEPIP/DAPE), 2009. « Cadrage macroéconomique 
dynamique du Compte d’opérations financières ». Republic of Cameroon. 
·  Export volumes 
Once again, baseline projections are based on the pre-crisis trend (2002-2008) with annual 
increases of 3-4 per cent in Burkina Faso, 11-12 per cent in Ghana, and around 5 per cent in 
Cameroon. 
 
In the crisis scenario, world exports are expected to contract by 6.5 per cent in 2009 for 
emerging and developing countries according to the World Economic Outlook (IMF, July 
2009). This represents a 10.6 percentage point reduction in export growth rates relative to the 
4.1 per cent increase posted in 2008. We assume that this hypothesis is applicable to Burkina 
Faso, where exports were also growing at around 4 per cent in 2008. In contrast, the main 
export commodities in Ghana, i.e. gold and cocoa, have been less affected by the crisis so far. 
Furthermore, pre-crisis growth trends were much higher in Ghana. We therefore assume a 
somewhat smaller 7.3 percentage point reduction in export growth rates in Ghana, which 
brings 2009 export volume growth from 12.3 per cent in the BaU scenario to 5.0 per cent in 
the  crisis  scenario.  In  the  case  of  Cameroon,  the  international  demand  for  Cameroonian 
exports remains endogenous. Export volumes stagnate in 2009 as a result of the crisis and 
subsequently grow at a slower rate than in the BaU scenario. 
 
Table 4: Export volumes, annual percentage change 
  Baseline  Crisis 
  2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Burkina Faso  4.0  3.6  3.3  -6.5  0.0  3.3 
Cameroon  5.0  4.6  4.7  0.1  3.4  3.1 
Ghana  12.3  12.0  11.4  5.0  0.0  11.4 
Source: authors’ elaboration.   65
Figure 9: Exports, Burkina Faso (Billions CFA Franc) 
 
Note: R
2 = 0.91 
 
Figure 10: Exports, Ghana (Billions US$) 
 
Note: R




In the baseline scenario (without crisis), we assume that import prices will stagnate after the 
record high levels posted in 2008.      
 
In the crisis scenario, changes in average import prices in 2009 are taken from IMF (2009c), 
then it is assumed that prices rebound beginning in 2010, as recent data suggest, to pre food-
crisis trends (2000-2006).  
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Table 5: Scenario on import prices, Burkina Faso (per cent) 
Products  Import 
share 
 
2009 Price sources : IMF 
 commodity prices 
Change in prices 
(forecast) 
  2009  2010  2011 
Cereals  1.4    Maize (corn), rice, barley, wheat  -18.1  4.9  4.9 
Fruits and vegetables  0.0    Banana, orange  -13.2  8.8  8.8 
Other subsistance agriculture  0.4    Maize (corn), rice, nuts  -6.4  6.2  6.2 
Cotton  0.2    Cotton  -16.2  2.2  2.2 
Other commercial agriculture  0.1    Agriculture raw materials  -18.8  1.2  1.2 
Cattle  0.0    Beef  -2.9  5.7  5.7 
Other livestock  0.0    Lamb, chicken, pork  -8.4  3.7  3.7 
Forestry  0.0    Agriculture raw materials  -18.8  1.2  1.2 
Fishing  0.0    Fish, prawns  -8.0  -7.2  -7.2 
Mining  0.4    Metal products  -18.8  1.2  1.2 
Beverage and tobacco  2.8    Beverages  -3.6  4.9  4.9 
Other modern manufacturing  86.6    Energy, food, industrial inputs  -31.3  8.8  8.8 
Building and construction  0.0    Non fuel price index  -23.4  6.2  6.2 
Transport  6.8           
Communication  0.3           
Financial services  0.1           
Other modern private services  0.8           
All  100    -  -18.1  4.9  4.9 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
Table 6: Scenario on import prices, Ghana (per cent) 
Products  Import 
share 
 
Price sources : IMF commodity prices 
Change in prices (forecast) 
  2009  2010  2011 
Cerals  0.5    Maize (corn), barley, wheat  -20.9  4.9  4.9 
Meat  1.8    Beef, lamb, chicken, pork  -2.9  3.7  3.7 
Rice  3.9    Rice  -13.4  7.5  7.5 
Other agriculture  1.7    Food prices  -8.9  4.9  4.9 
Mining  4.6    Metal prices  -32.2  12.7  12.7 
Food manufactured  10.9    Commodity price index  -20.8  11.4  11.4 
Non food manufactured  76.3           
Electricity  0.2           
All  100           
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
   67
Table 7: Scenario on import prices, Cameroon (per cent) 
Products  Import 
share 
 
2009 Price sources : IMF commodity prices 
Change in prices 
(forecast) 
  2009  2010  2011 
Food agriculture  0.37   Maize (corn), rice, barley, wheat, peanuts, orange  -43.6  2.4  9.1 
Cash crops agriculture  0.00   Cotton, cocoa, coffee arabica, coffee robusta, plam oil, banana  -11.9  8.1  5.4 
Livestock  0.00   Lamb, chicken, beef, pork  -10.5  4.5  3.8 
Forestry  0.10   Hides, logs  -6.9  -0.2  2.2 
Fishing  0.00   Seafood  -4.8  -6.5  -1.2 
Crude oil  26.48   Crude oil  -42.7  26.0  8.7 
Other extractive products  1.93   Metal price  -24.1  29.6  11.1 
Meat and fishes  2.20   Meat and sea foods  -10.1  4.5  3.4 
Grains and flour  4.80   Cereals  -27.7  0.4  4.8 
Cocoa, coffee, tea and sugar  1.07   Beverages, sugar  -8.8  10.9  5.8 
Oleaginous products and animal foods  0.50   Vegetable oil  -36.4  9.9  6.8 
Cereal-based products  0.16   Cereals  -27.7  0.4  4.8 
Dairy products  1.92   Food-price-index-120  -19.9  7.5  5.3 
Beverages  1.46   Agriculture raw material  -19.2  11.3  2.1 
Tobacco  0.38   Industrial Inputs Price Index  -24.0  20.7  8.0 
Textiles and clothing  2.73   Wood  -11.9  -1.6  4.2 
Leather and footwear  0.16   Wood, hides, logs  -11.9  -1.6  4.2 
Processed wood except furniture  0.03   Petroleum  -42.7  26.0  8.7 
Paper  2.37   Non-fuel-price-index  -19.2  12.5  6.0 
Refined oil  1.82   Rubber  -34.8  25.8  10.7 
Chemicals  9.91   Metals  -24.1  29.6  11.1 
Rubber and plastic  1.02   Commodity price index  -19.2  12.5  6.0 
Non metallic minerals  1.70          
Metals  7.58          
Machines  12.94          
Audiovisual equipment  1.30          
Vehicles  5.65          
Furniture and miscellaneous products  0.43          
Electricity, gas and water  0.00          
Construction  0.02          
Trade  0.00          
Repair  0.00          
Hotels and restaurants  0.47          
Transport, warehouse, and communication  3.88          
Posts and telecommunications  0.27          
Financial services  1.80          
Real estate  0.00          
Services to firms  4.54          
All  100.00           
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
 